KURDAMAL Vs. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY BIKANER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER Kurdamal, who is an existing operator on the Sardarsahar-Sadulpur route, questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner to issue permit to respondent Jagdish Prasad on the ground that the respondent having not put in the vehicle within the time fixed in the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority having not extended the period before the same expired, the Regional Transport Authority was debarred from issuing the permit thereafter.

(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. He submits that in accordance with rule 86 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, hereinafter to be referred as the "rules", the Regional Transport Authority has no such power left in itself on the expiry of the period fixed in the resolution granting the permit. I may read rule 86 verbatim : - "r. 86. Permit entry of registration mark on - (a) Save in the case of a temporary permit if the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit and applicant is not on the date of application in possession of the vehicle duly registered, the applicant shall within one month of the sanction of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, or such longer period as the Authority may specify, produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that Authority in order that particulars of that registration mark may be entered in the permit. (b) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has, if the form of permit so requires, been entered therein and in the event of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the prescribed period the Regional Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application''. The frame of the rule unmistakably shows that a distinction has been made between an order granting permit and the act of actually issuing the permit. The permit is granted by resolution. The permit, which means the document issued by the Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle as a stage carriage (vide section 2 (20) of the Motor Vehicle Act) is issued by the office of the Regional Transport Authority. Rule 86 (a) enables an applicant to whom permit has been ordered to be granted to furnish the particulars about the registration mark of the vehicle, when he has no ready vehicle, to obtain the vehicle within one month of the sanction of the grant or such longer period as the authority may specify, and then to indicate the registration mark of the vehicle before the authority so that the particulars of registration mark may be entered in the permit. What clause (b) of this rule forbids is the issuance of the permit namely, the document without the registration mark of the vehicle being entered in such document. It also provides that if this is not done within the period laid down by the Regional Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority may revoke the sanction, which means, the grant of the permit. It is true, where a particluar period has been fixed by the Regional Transport Authority saying that in the event of the registratior mark not being supplied within the period allowed, the sanction or grant shall stand revoked automatically, the Regional Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to thereafter issue the permit. The reason is not far to seek. In terms of the resolution itself the grant had ipso facto come to an end, but if there is no such qualification laid down in the Regional Transport Authority's resolution, then the grant does not ipso facto come to an end, but a positive order has to be passed by the Regional Transport Authority to extend the time, if it is so minded to do, before the original period fixed had expired. I am unable to read this provision in this way. There is no limitation on the Regional Transport Authority to order the extension of the time only before such period had expired. In my view, the grant subsists till it is cancelled by a positive order. Till then it is open to the Regional Transport Authority to extend the period and issue the permit. I am unable to hold that this provision has to be construed like sec. 149 Civil Procedure Code in relation to period fixed for something to be done in a proceeding before a civil court. There, the court may not be held to have power to extend the time once that period had tome to an end. But, in the present case with the grant of a permit a substantive right to have business of providing transport service is acquired and for the destruction of such a right one has to look for a clear cut provision. Since there is no positive bar created against the Regional Transport Authority to extend the time even after the period once fixed has expired, I do not think the Regional Transport Authority was precluded from extending the time if in its discretion it decided to do so. As I have already observed, this cannot be compared with a situation where the resolution itself has said that in the event of the registration number being not furnished within the stated time, the grant shall stand cancelled. In the last mentioned contingency the grant no longer subsists and therefore, there could hardly be any question of extending the period once the grant has itsef come to an endj In a case of the instant kind the grant still subsisted, even though the period fixed in the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority had once come to an end. The Regional Transport Authority had the discretion to still issue the permit, because the grant had not come to an end. It is to be borne in mind that provisions which create restrictions on the exercise of a legal or a fundamental right have to be construed strictly and in the case of doubt the benefit thereof has to be allowed by upholding the right rather than destroying it only by construction of a particular provision in such a manner. That being so, I am definitely of the opinion that the Regional Transport Authority had the discretion to extend the time and issue the permit in the present case.