MURARI LAL Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for bail under sec. 498 Cr. P. C. by Murarilal. It is stated by him that he is a resident of Jaipur City, that he is a well-known apothecary (Attar) and is reputed to know certain formulas for sublimating base metals. His achievements have led a few unscrupulous persons to exploit his secrets and they are bringing pressure upon him to disclose the secrets. He proceeds to say that one Anandilal has made a false report against him to the effect that he was cheated by the petitioner of Rs. 8303/- by making him believe that he would purchase gold from that sum and would then be able to give him double the quantify of that gold. The police has registered a case against him at Police Station Manak Chowk under sec. 420 I. P. C. and the officer investigating the case is acting in a partisan manner and trying to arrest the petitioner in order to humiliate and harass him by means of torture. The petitioner proceeds to say that he moved an application in the court of the First Class Magistrate, Shri N. N. Bhatna-gar for anticipatory bail, since he apprehended foul play at the hands of the police officer. THIS application was taken up by the Magistrate on 13. 2. 59, but it was opposed by the prosecuting inspector and the investigating officer by saying that no direction for the arrest of the petitioner was issued by that time. In view of this position taken up by the prosecution, the court was requested to postpone the case to 13. 3. 59. According to the petitioner, when he went out of the court after the said adjournment, the investigating officer tried to take him to the police station by force on the false plea of interrogating him but he was not successful in arresting him on account of an intervention by other people. It was urged by the petitioner that the offence under sec. 420 I. P. C, was bailable, that the postponement of bail by the learned Magistrate was tantamount to denial of the bail, that he was extremely apprehensive of police highhandedness and therefore it was prayed that this Court should exercise its powers under sec. 498 Cr. P. C. and release him on bail. It was also contended by the petitioner's learned counsel that sec. 497 Cr. P. C. was amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act No. 26 of 1955 and that the words "or suspected of the commission of" were added simply for the purpose of enabling the courts to grant anticipatory bail. According to learned counsel, the view taken by this Court in Jubarmal vs. The State{l) against the grant of anticipatory bail did nor hold good any longer in view of the said amendment. THIS application came for hearing on 4. 3. 59. It would not be out of place to mention here that the application would have been decided on that day or on the following day as other bail applications are generally decided, but the learned Deputy Government Advocate expressed his inability to argue the matter since he was not posted with the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner very vehemently urged on that day that the police was bent upon arresting his client, that he would be humiliated and tortured pending the decision of his application and if an interim bail is not given, his application would become infructuous. An interim bail was, therefore, granted to the petitioner. Thereafter, when the application came for hearing on 8th April, 1959, learned Government Advocate opposed the application by saying that the allegations made by the petitioner against the police or the apprehension expressed by him were baseless and imaginary, that although a case under sec. 420 I. P. C. was registered against the petitioner, the stage for his arrest had not arrived and so long as he was not put under any sort of restraint, there was no occasion for releasing him on bail. It was also strongly urged that an application for anticipatory bail does not lie, that this point is already concluded by a decision of bench of this Court in Jubarmal's case (1), that the petitioner ought not to have approached this Court so long as his application was not decided by the Magistrate and therefore the application was fit to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended with great vehemence that the amendment made in sec. 497 Cr. P. C. in 1955 was affected with the sole purpose of enabling the courts to grant anticipatory bail, that the view taken by this Court in Juharmal's case (1) does not hold good any longer and so the petitioner's application should be allowed. The questions for determination are: - (1) Whether the view taken by this Court in Juharmal's case (1) does not hold good any longer and the courts are empowered to grant anticipatory bail in view of the amendment made in sec. 497 Cr. P. C. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, No. 26 of 1955, and (2) whether this is a fit case in which this Court should grant bail even before the petitioner's application for bail is decided by the courts below.

(2.) TO begin with the first point learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Vol. IX No. 16 and 17 of the Lok Sabha Debates dated 6th and 7th December, 1954. It is pointed out by him that the words "or suspected of the commission of*' were added after the words "any person accused of" in sec. 497 on account of an amendment moved by Pt. Thakurdas Bhargava and that the report of his speech, which appears in columns 2027 to 2030 in Vol. IX No. 16, clearly shows that he had moved the amendment only for enabling the courts to grant anticipatory bail. He has then referred to the reports of the speeches published in Vol. IX-No. 17 in columns 2101 to 2104 and urged that this amendment was accepted by the then Home Minister, Dr. K. N. Katju. It has been urged by learned Government Advocate in reply that legislative proceedings cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing an Act, that sec. 497 should be interpreted as it stands after the amendment and if the mover of the amendment had in his view the object of introducing a provision for enabling the courts to grant anticipatory bail, that objective has not been achieved. I have given due consideration to these arguments and it may be pointed Out that in Charanjitlal Chowdhury vs. The Union of lndia (2) it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that legislative proceedings cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing an Act or any of its provisions, but they are relevant for the proper understanding of the circumstances under which it was passed and the reasons which necessitated it. It is clear from the above observation that legislative proceedings can be looked into for the proper understanding of the circumstances under which a particular Act or amendment is made and also for understanding the reasons which necessitated the passing of that legislation. The legislative proceeding cannot certainly be referred to for the purpose of construing an Act and therefore it would be proper, to look into the above amendment in the light of the said observation. I have carefully gone through the relevant speeches made in the Parliament and reported in Vol. IX No. 16 and 17. It is clear from the reported speech of Pt. Thakurdas Bhargava in columns 2027 to 2030 in Vol. IX No. 16 that he wanted to introduce a provision for anticipatory bail and to get it accepted by the House. He argued the point very strongly and even gave illustrations why a provision for anticipatory bail was necessary in his opinion. It appears that another distinguished Member Shri U. M. Trivedi had also moved an amendment to the same effect though it was in very different and clearer terms. At the same time, it is equally clear that Shri U. M. Trivedi's amendment was not accepted and that the Hon'ble Home Minister Dr. K. N. Katju was not in favour of introducing any provision for anticipatory bail. He opposed the amendment sought by Shri Pt. Thakur Das Bhargava also and urged with equal vehemence that an endeavour to get what was called anticipatory bail was almost revolutionary and that our criminal jurisprudence was not aware of it. He also maintained that sec. 496 and 497 should be left as they were. Referring to the words "or suspected of" which Pt. Bhargava wanted to be added, it was remarked by him, "i cannot understand that". Thereafter, a few remarks in the nature of breeze were made by Shri Bhargava, Dr. Katju and Shri S. S. More and then Dr. Katju remarked that if the Hon'ble friend wanted the words "or suspected of" to be added, he had no objection. I have not been referred to not have I been able to find any remark by Katju to show that he had accepted the addition of the words "or suspected of", because he was convinced of the necessity of introducing a provision for anticipatory bail. On the other hand, it is clear from his speech that he was strongly opposed to making any provision for anticipatory bail and if he acceded to the addition of the words "or suspected of" it was because he thought that the addition of these words was not objectionable and it would not alter the settled position. The circumstances under which the said addition was thus made in sec. 497 Cr. P. C. do not,to my mind, support the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel to the effect that the view expressed by this Court in Juharmal's case (2) does not hold good any longer. The mover of the amendment may have in his mind that the addition of the above words would enable the courts to grant anticipatory bail, but the amendment does not seem to have been accepted in that sense and as I will show presently, it cannot be construed to mean that it has given to the courts an authority to grant anticipatory bail. It may be pointed out that even before the said amendment, a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court had taken a view in the case of Hidayat Ullah Khan S/o Sher Nawab Khan vs. The Crown (3) that the High Court had power under sec. 498 Cr. P. C. to make an order that a person who was suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a police officer or a court shall be admitted to bail. It is not unlikely that the mover of the amendment may have this case in view and he might have thought that the addition of the words "or suspected of" would suffice to enable the courts to grant anticipatory bail. The view taken in the above case, however, was not accepted by a Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Amir Chand vs. The Crown (4 ). A similar matter came before this Court in Juharmal's case (1) and the view taken in Amir Chand's case (4) was adopted and that taken in Hidayat Ullah Khan's case (3) was negatived. It was pointed out in Juharmal's case that the words "released on bail" appearing in sec. 497 and "admitted to bail" appearing in sec. 498 conveyed the same meaning. This has been explained at great length in Amir Chand's case (4) in the judgment given by learned Kapur J. It was also pointed out in the above case that the very notion of bail presupposed some form of previous restraint. In Juharmal's case also it was observed that it is inherent in the nature of bail that there must be some kind of restraint on the person bailed out and unless there is such restraint, there is no question of grant of bail to him. In my opinion, the addition of the words "or suspected of the commission of" would only mean that just as any person accused of any non-bailable offence who is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer incharge of a police station or who appears or is brought before a court may be released on bail in the circumstances given in sec. 497, so also a person who is suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence and who is arrested or detained on account of such suspicion may be released on bail if he appears or is brought before a court. It would nor mean that a person who is suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence, may at any time, walk into the court and request it that he should be released on bail simply because he is so suspected. The court would be able to grant him bail only if he is able to show that he has been arrested or detained or that a warrant or an order in writing for his arrest has been issued against him under sec. 56 Cr. P. C. In other words, unless he has been arrested or detained or there is an actual danger of restraint being placed upon him on account of the issue of a warrant or an order under sec. 56 Cr. P. C. , the question of releasing him cannot arise. It does not seem necessary here to repeat all those arguments which, have been given against anticipatory bail in Amir Chand's case (4) and Jubar Mal's case (l) and to show the anomalous position which would result on account of an anticipatory bail being granted under sec. 500 to 502 Cr. P. C. 1 would have examined this matter at greater length and would have had no hesitation in referring the matter again to a larger bench if I were convinced that there was a prima facie case for revising the view taken in Jubar Mal's case (1) but I think that the said view remains unaffected by the amendment. Moreover, I find that sec. 497 is not even applicable to the present case, because the offence which is said to have been registered against the petitioner is a bailable and not a non-bailable offence. In the case of a bailable offence it is sec. 496 Cr. P. C. which is applicable and not sec. 497. Sec. 496 Cr. P. C. runs as follows: - In what eases bail to be taken - When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail: Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided: Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sec. 107, sub-sec. (4) or sec. 117, sub-sec. (3 ).