CHHOTU LAL Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition seeks to challenge order dated 22.6.1994 by which Chairman, Municipal Board, Nawa dismissed the petitioner from service.

(2.) PETITIONER was serving on the post of Naka Guard at Municipal Board, Nawa having been appointed as such in 1974. A charge-sheet under Rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short CCA Rules) was served upon the petitioner on four charges and Executive Officer of the Municipal Board was appointed as Enquiry Officer. He submitted his report to Chairman, Municipal Board, Nawa and the same was considered by the Administrative Committee on 14.6.1994. The Committee resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service and accordingly the aforesaid order was passed by Chairman of Municipal Board, Nawa. Subsequently however, on appeal preferred by petitioner the matter was placed before Full House of Municipal Board, which unanimously by resolution dated 13.7.1994 allowed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that petitioner was not afforded full opportunity of hearing and was not granted opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the charges against petitioner did not warrant dismissal from service. The order of dismissal, therefore, was set aside and petitioner was directed to be treated as continuous in service and the intervening period was ordered to be regularized as earned leave. The matter was thus remanded to Administrative Committee. Consequential order of reinstating the petitioner in service was passed by Chairman of the Board on 5.8.1994. It appears that a note of dissent was put by Executive Officer, Municipal Board under Section 68 (2) of Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and the matter was forwarded to Government. The Government in purported exercise of its power under Section 65 of the Act by its order dated 15.12.1994 rescinded the resolution of the Board dated 13.7.1994. The Chairman of the Board then passed a fresh order of dismissal of petitioner on 4.7.1994. PETITIONER has assailed validity of the subsequent order of Government dated 15.12.1994 and the order of Chairman dated 4.7.1995 and has also additionally challenged validity of dismissal order dated 22.6.1994.

(3.) CONTENTION that Government did not have power under Section 285 of the Act to rescind the resolution, although may, at the first look appear to be attractive, but in substance, it does not carry much weight because Section 285 of the Act provides that : 285 Powers of suspending execution of order etc. of board (1) If in the opinion of any such officer as may be appointed or authorized by the State Government in this behalf the execution of any order or resolution of a board of the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a board, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may, by order in writing under his signature, suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 285 of the Act provides that : (2) When any such officer makes any order under this section, he shall forthwith forward to the State Government and to the board affected thereby a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons for making it, and it shall be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 285 further states that : No order of such officer passed under this section shall be confirmed, revised or modified by the State Government without giving the board reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the said order. What the petitioner is contending is that orders passed by officer appointed in this behalf in the first instance and referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 285, are the once which can be suspended, but in substance, the Government under sub-section (2) has also the power to make the initial order of suspending the execution of resolution of a Board or prohibit the doing of something proposed to be done thereby, absolute. This would be evident from reading of sub-section (2) wherein it has been provided that when an officer makes such order, he shall forthwith forward to the State Government and the Board affected thereby a copy of such order with a statement of the reasons for making it, and it shall be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. Use of the word permanently of sub-section (2) indicates the intention of Legislature that an order of suspension of resolution in the first instance may be made by Government without any restriction of time limit, which is subsequently provided by use of the word permanently which the Government may enforce such order passed in the first instance to authorities for specified period. If the Government is conferred with the power making initial order permanent, consequences would be just the same as that of rescinding the resolution.