MOHNI DEVI Vs. GHANSHYAM DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD . The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for eviction, relating to the suit-shop against the defendant-appellants, on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal & bona fide necessity. The learned trial court decided the issue of default, against the plaintiff, but decreed the suit for eviction, on the ground of personal & bona fide necessity of the plaintiff. The matter was carried in appeal. The learned first appellate court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree of the learned trial court. Feeling aggrieved thereby, this second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellants.

(2.) BOTH the courts below, after appreciating the evidence and material on record, have decided the issue regarding personal and bona fide necessity, in favour of the plaintiff. There is concurrent finding of both the courts below that there is personal and bona fide requirement of the suit-premises by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent. The question, relating to personal and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff, does not give rise to any substantial question of law. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar and Bros and another (1998(6) SCC 748) : 1998(2) RCR (Rent) 249 (SC).Hon'ble The Supreme Court has held that bona fide requirement of the appellant, does not give rise to any substantial question of law. In the case of Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand, 1998(2) RCR (Rent) 410 : 1998(6) SCC 683 : 1998(2) RCR (Rent) 410 (SC), the question, formulated as to whether the finding relating to bona fide requirement of landlord, of the courts below is vitiated due to irrelevant consideration and not under law, has been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court, to be "not even a question of law let alone a substantial question of law."

(3.) THE learned counsel for the appellants, pointed out that before the learned first appellate court, the defendant-appellants moved an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, which was not decided by the learned first appellate court, and as such, the decision of the learned first appellate court, is vitiated on this ground alone. But, a perusal of the file of the learned first appellate court, shows that on 9.8.97, the appellants moved an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, to which, the respondent stated that he has no objection. Thereafter, the learned first appellate court recorded that the cards, which were sought to be produced on record, would be taken into consideration, while deciding the appeal. Thus, from the proceedings dated 9.8.97, it is clear that the learned first appellate court had decided and allowed the appellants' application under Order 41 Rule, 27, CPC. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned first appellate court did not decide the application of the appellants, under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, is not tenable.