CHAIN SINGH Vs. RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SINCE identical questions of law have been raised by the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions and since they have been heard together, they are being disposed of finally by this single common order. For the sake of convenience and ready reference. I deem it appropriate to refer to the facts stated in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/1989 titled Chainsingh v. R.S.R.T.C. treating it as the main case.

(2.) THE petitioner in this writ petition was initially appointed on daily wage basis on the post of Conductor in Dungarpur Depot of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). The respondent -corporation is a statutory body and being creature of the statute is obviously covered within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is discharging its duties as an instrumentality of the State.

(3.) IN S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/89 the petitioner discharged his duties as conductor to the Corporation for considerably long spell of time pursuant to his appointment on the said post vide order dated 18.06.1987 on daily wage basis @ Rs. 20/ - per day subject to the conditions as stipulated in the appointment order itself. From perusal of appointment order dated 18.6.1987 (Ex. 1), it is apparent that no time limit as regards the duration of service of the petitioner as daily wager has been specified by the corporation. Since the petitioner fulfilled the requisite conditions as specified in the appointment order itself, he joined duties as conductor on daily wage basis w.e.f. 18.6.1987. His work performance was considered to be satisfactory and his case was recommended by the competent authority for being appointed on probation in the regular pay scale of Rs. 880 -1680 excluding usual allowances as admissible to him in accordance with the rules. The probation period of service was initially fixed for one year which is apparent from the order, dated 20.1.1988 vide (Ex. 2). Thereafter the petitioner continued to discharge his duties and successfully completed the probationary period as fixed in terms of the aforesaid order, and as such he became a regular employee of the corporation since his services were not dispensed with by the corporation during the period of probation and hence a lawful right to claim continuity and regularization in services of the corporation had legitimately come to be vested in him. However all of sudden vide impugned order, dated. 9.3.1989 his services were terminated by the competent authority on the ground that he had become a surplus employee of the corporation and hence in view of the policy decision of high powered committee he was no longer required to continue. This fact is borne out from the perusal of the termination order, dated 9.3.1989 itself from which it is apparent that since the corporation had made recruitments of conductors at mass scale for and in excess of the sanctioned strength, for which it had become necessary for the corporation to do short listing of the conductors and consequently it had no option but to retrench the service of those conductors who were appointed in the services of the corporation earlier in point of time so as to make room for other conductors, who had subsequently been recruited and appointed as daily wagers i.e., the new appointees who were to be accommodated by the corporation on the said posts and for which it started with the indiscriminate policy of mass scale retrenchments not warranted by any provisions of the Act or the Rules governing the same not only with a view to accommodate the fresh recruitees but also to safeguard its position as an instrumentality of the state with a view to cover up the wrong doings of its own functionaries who were responsible for taking such policy decision of mass scale retrenchments as a face saking device to accommodate the new appointees on the said posts. Hence this modus operandi was adopted by the corporation resulting in its arbitrary decision of affecting mass scale retrenchment of the petitioners which had given rise to the filing of the aforesaid writ petitions in this Court.