LAWS(RAJ)-1998-1-52

RAVI BHUSHAN PURI Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Decided On January 05, 1998
RAVI BHUSHAN PURI Appellant
V/S
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RAJASTHAN Pharmacy Council is constituted under the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948. Council Members are nominated as well elected as per the provisions of Section 19 of the Act for a period of five years. The petitioner was one of the elected member having been so notified vide Rajasthan Gazette dated 7.1.1988. There is a State Council constituted who has to perform various statutory functions as per the provisions of the Act. One of the function is to register the Pharmacists by the Council from amongst the Pharmacists who hold and possess the qualifications. If the registration is denied to any such Pharmacist, he has a right to file a statutory appeal under Section 33. The decision of the State Council is final in the matter of registration of the applicant as Pharmacist. A dispute is said to have arisen in regard to the registration of the fresh pharmacist which dispute was even taken up right upto the High Court by the Rajasthan Pharmacists Association through its Secretary in Civil Writ Petition No. 683/83. Ultimately, the Division Bench of this Court in D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 319/84 had dismissed the writ petition as well the appeal. Certain matter was again taken up right upto the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 214/89 by Mukut Bihari Lal Sharma in Public Interest Litigation. It was alleged in the writ petition filed by Mr. Sharma that the registration by the State Council was not being done in accordance with law. Certain irregularities and illegalities were also alleged. The High Court ultimately had not agreed to the submissions made by said Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma. It is stated and alleged by the petitioner that despite the fact that even the High Court had not found any irregularity and illegality in the registration of the pharmacists, but still certain persons with vested interest had been levelling allegations against the Council. It is stated by the Counsel for the petitioner that as soon as the writ pe- tition was dismissed, to harass and victimise the petitioner, one Deputy Superintendent of Police got an FIR recorded being FIR No. 95. /90 on 28. 8. 1990 in Special Wing of Police i. e. Anti Corruption Department. The FIR is said to have been recorded for committing the offence of Sections 161, 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B of the IPC and Section 5d (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is stated that the petitioner's name has not been mentioned in the FIR nor any allegation of corruption, forgery or fabrication or even of conspiracy has been narrated in the FIR but still according to the petitioner, for the malafide reasons, the petitioner being elected member of the State Council was being harassed and victimised in the garb of the aforesaid FIR. Being forced and compelled, the petitio- ner approached this court for quashing of the FIR under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) IT is settled law that the High Court is not to interfere for quashing the FIR unless there are some facts and circumstances showing that no offence whatsoever has been made out in the contents of the FIR or that the proceedings have been started as a lever to misuse the process of law by the complainant against the accused. The well settled principles have been laid- down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and others. Counsel for the petitioner relies on the principles and illustrations as enumerated in paras 102, 111 and 140 in Bhajan Lal's case which amongst others read as under- "the following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima- facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." The FIR as recorded reads as under - ...[VERNACULAR TEXT OMITTED]...

(3.) THE petitioner had impleaded the State Agencies as respondents and rightly so for the reason that the petitioner was praying for quashing the FIR registered on behalf of the State. However, an application had been made by Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma for to be impleaded as respondent which application was al- lowed. Said Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma had earlier been taking up the matter against Pharmacy Council or its members by filing a writ petition in Public Interest Litigation and had failed to get any relief from the Court. He is being represented through Shri V. S. Gurjar Advocate. No relief is claimed by the petitioner against the added respondent, however, counsel for the added respondent states that direct writ petition under Article 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable and the petitioner ought to have filed the petition u/s. 482 Cr. PC. His submission is that if alternative specific remedy is available, remedy under the Constitutional power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be availed off. The counsel for the respondent relies on State of M. P Vs. Pirthi Chand and another (2) wherein in para 11 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under- "in State of Haryana V. Bhajan Lal, a two Judge Bench of this Court laid down certain broad tests to exercise the inherent power or extraordinary power of the High Court. It is not necessary to reiterate the guidelines. Suffice to state that they are only illustrative. The High Court should sparingly and only in exceptional cases, in other words, in rarest of rare cases, and not merely because it would be appealable to the learned Judge, be inclined to exercise the power to quash the FIR/charge- sheet/complaint. In that case the Court held that the FIR should not be quashed since it disclosed prima-facie cognizable offences to proceed further in the investigation. In Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill JT (1995) 7 SC 299 this Court reiterated the above view and held that when the complaint or charge-sheet filed disclosed primafacie evidence the court would not weigh at that stage and find out whether offence could be made out. The order of the High Court exercising the power under Article 256 was accordingly set-aside."'