PRITHVI PAL SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under S. 482 Cr. P. C. for giving set off for a period of two years eight months & 21 days to the petitioner, the period he had remained in jail during the pendency of this appeal in another case in D B. Cr. Appeal No. 453/79-Prithvi and others vs. State. In 1979 the accused was tried in two cases one was 25/78 and the another was 3/79. In the earlier case, the accused was convicted for offence under Sec. 326 IPC and sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/ -. He was further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for two months in default of payment of fine. The Court had also convicted him for offence under Sec 3/25-A of the Arms Act and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences were made to run concurrently. In case No. 3/79, the accused was convicted for offence under Sec, 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. Accused preferred an appeal in both these case. His appeals were admitted. He was granted bail in appeal No. 405/79 which was SB Cr. appeal finally disposed of on 8th July, 1988. The appeal in the case under Sec. 302 IPC was D. B. Cr. appeal No. 453/79 in which the accused succeeded and his conviction and sentence was set aside. He, therefore, was ordered to be set at liberty. Accused has now moved this application that the period which he has undergone in Jail when his bail was rejected in a murder case be treated as his period in custody also for the purpose of the appeal No. 405/79. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.

(2.) IN normal course when the accused is in jail in a particular case only in that case he is entitled to the period of set off but there are situations other than normal also where the accused remained in jail in two or more than two cases simultaneously. IN those cases the period of set off is to be calculated in two or more than two cases if the sentence in all the cases are made to run concurrently. That, however, was not the situation in the instant case. The accused was order-ed to be released on bail in the present case and, therefore, his period ought not to have been counted yet this case presents typical features as the order granting bail remained only a paper order and physically the accused could not be released till the period his D. B. murder appeal was not decided which ultimately resulted in acquittal. Therefore, the accused could not have the liberty of being on bail despite the orders of the Court. Hence, in the peculiar circumstances, in my opinion, ends of justice would meet in case, the period the accused had been in jail for two years eight months and 21 days, be treated as a period of set off for the purposes of sentence in the present case.