SHRI KISHAN Vs. RAMPAL RAM CHANDRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) K S. Lodha, J 1. This is a debtor's appeal against the order of the learned District Judge, Merta, dated 1 -9 -1979 refusing to extend the time for making an application for discharge and annulling the order of adjudication. The appellant Shri Kishan had applied under Section 10 of the Provincial Insolvency Act on 25 -9 -1973 and an adjudication order was passed on 25 -1 -1975 giving six months time to the debtor -appellant to apply for discharge. This time was expired on 25 -7 -1975, but no application for discharge was filed by that date. However, an application for discharge was filed on 3 -10 -1975 along with a prayer for condoning the delay. The grounds set -forth for condoning the delay were that there had been floods on account of heavy rains and thereafter, the petitioner was down with fever and, therefore, he could not come to the court within time to apply for discharge. It appears that this application did not receive the attention of the court till 1 -9 -1979, although it appears to have been filed on 3 -10 -1975 and it remained lying on the file. It further appears that no notice of this application was also sent to the creditors, so, they also could not file any objection to it. However, when on 1 -9 -1979 the matter came up before the learned District Judge for final discharge, his attention was drawn to this application. Having considered the application, the learned District Judge was of the opinion that no sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay. He, accordingly, rejected the application and annulled the order of adjudication.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.

(3.) SO far as the first contention goes, there is no disuute to the fact that the court has power to extend the time originally fixed for making an application for discharge and the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel in this respect do support his contention. The learned counsel for the respondents has also not refused this proposition of law. However, the question is whether sufficient cause for extending the time and condoning the delay has been shown to the satisfaction of the court. This question depends upon the particular fact of each case and no hard and fast rule can be envisaged in this respect. In the present case, the learned District Judge has found that the cause shown is not to his satisfaction in as much as the allegations are wholly vague. It has not been stated as to when the floods came and for how long the roads closed, nor it has been stated as to when the petitioner was taken down by fever and when he re -gained health in order to come to the court. In order that the court must be satisfied about the genuineness of the grounds raised, so that it may be satisfied that in fact there was sufficient cause the details of the period for which the roads were remained closed on account of the floods and the exact period of the inability of the petitioner to come to the court on account of his ill -ness were absolutely necessary. The petitioner has given no details at all and has merely made a bold allegation that there had been heavy rains and thereafter he had been down with fever. On such vague allegation, the learned District Judge was rightly not satisfied and I do not se any reason to take a different view.