LAKSHMI PRASAD MATHUR Vs. DILIP SINGH CHORDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE have heard the appellants' application for condonation of delay in filing this appeal. This appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance is against the judgment dated 2. 4. 85 of a learned single judge of this court in a civil first appeal.

(2.) THE impugned judgment of the learned single judge was passed on 2. 4. 85 and this special appeal has been filed on 11. 11. 87 after the lapse of more than one year and seven months when the prescribed limitation for filing such appeal is 30 days only. THE time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment was only a few days and, therefore, even after excluding the same there is inordinate delay in filing the appeal.

(3.) SINCE considerable emphasis was laid from both the sides on a proper construction of section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would be appropriate to quote the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ramlal's case (supra) which has been applied in the decisions thereafter. This principle is as under : - "in construing S. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna V. Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad. 269. "section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafide is impugnable to the appellant. " From the above undisputed facts it is obvious that atleast negligence and inaction of the appellants is obvious from the absence of any logical account being given by them to explain the period of over two months in filing the SLP in the Supreme Court after engaging a counsel and getting a certified copy of the impugned judgment and in again delaying the filing of this special appeal by another two weeks after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition.