SHANKER LAL SHARMA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE writ petitions are directed against the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal dated 17th July, 1976, which shall be disposed of by this common order. The petitioners were third grade teachers. The Inspector of Schools, Jaipur, prepared a seniority list of third grade teachers as it stood on 1st September, 1961, in accordance with the Government of Rajas-than circular dated 15th January, 1966 In this seniority list, the petitioners were placed at number 1016, 1030 and 1024. On the strenghth of this placement, they come to be promoted as grade II teacher on 31st October, 1972. But their seniority was altered on 10th May, 1976 and the petitioners were brought down steeply to Nos. 2975, 2533 and 3267 respectively. As a consequence, they were also reverted to grade III. The petitioners appealed against this alteration in the seniority and reversion to the Tribunal mainly on the grounds that alteration has taken place without notice in violation of principles of natural justice and without recording any reasons. The contention of the respondents was that they were placed calier at a particular number on the asumption that they had attained intermediate qualification on 31st August, 1961. But later on, when it was discovered that in fact they passed the intermediate examination in a supplementary chance the result of which was declared on 9th September, 1951, and consequently a rectification had to be made. The learned tribunal rejected the appeals. Hence, these writ petitions.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioners raised entirely a new contention before this court. What he now convasses is that according to sections 3 the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal Act, 1976, the tribunal was to consist of a chairman who shall be a super-tiem scale officer of the I. S. S. and at least two other members one of when shall be a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. At the relevant time that is at the time of hearing and disposing of the appeal one of the members, namely, the judicial member, Shri G. K. Sharma had demitted office and there were only two members who could not constitute the Tribunal. THE learned counsel agrees that in virtue of section 5 (2), two members of the Tribunal can hear and dispose of the matter before in, but his argument is that there was no tribunal in existence on the relevant date as envisaged by the said section 3. Reading as I do, the provisions of section 3, I find that the Tribunal once properly constituted continues to exist inspite of the subsequent vacancies and it cannot be said that whenever any member or even Chairman has ceased to hold office, the Tribunal has ceased to exist even though the Act should have but has not specifically so provided. THE State Government notification dated 21th June, 1976, shows that it constituted the Tribunal consisting of three members in accordance with section 3. THE initial constitution therefore unassailable and the subsequent vacancies if remaining unfilled cannot affect was its coostitution or the continuance and it can dispose of all apeals relating to service matters as long as two members are there to do so. This view is supported by Collefor of Etha vs. Rani Gulab Kanwar (1 ). Section 101 of (he Government of India Act provided that at least one third of the High Court shall be barristers. It was held that if on account of certain reasons a vacancy occurs, the other judges of the High Court shall be deemed incompetent to carry on the work of the High Court till the vacancy has been filled up. Similarly when the office of the Chief Justice of Patna High Court fell vacant on account of the lamentable death of Sir Courtacy-Terrall, it was held in Emperor vs. Sohrai Koeri (2) that it could not be said that till the vacancy is filled, there no validly constituted High Court. THE main thrust of the attack even if permitted at this stage, thus miserably fails.

(3.) THE result is that these writ petitions have no force and are here by dismissed. THEre shall, however, be no order as to costs. .