LAWS(RAJ)-1978-8-2

AMAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Decided On August 21, 1978
AMAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners have invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court by way of an application under section 482 Cr. P. C. for quashing the Criminal proceedings pending against them in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalore, under sections 147, 148, 401, 323 and 326, I. P. C. on the ground that consent to the withdrawal of the prosecution was wrongly with held by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalore.

(2.) THE relevant facts giving rise to this application under section 482, Cr. P. C. may be briefly stated as follows: -

(3.) I have gone through the referred to above authorities and considered the rival contentions. I may observe at the outset that sec. 494, Old Cr. P. C. does not specify or define the circumstances under which a withdrawal from the prosecution may be made by the Public Prosecutor and, therefore, no invariable rule prescribing the limits within which a withdrawal can be made under this section can be laid down. Each case has to be judged on its peculiar facts and circumstances. Suffice it to say, that sec 494, Old Cr. P. C. empowers the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution in all cases conducted by him. A discretion is given to him alone in this matter. He may, now ever, consult the Government or the District Magistrate before exercising his discretion. All that sec. 494, Old Cr. P. C. requires is that the Public Prosecutor should state unconditionally that he does not want to prosecute the accused for certain offences When a withdrawal from prosecution is formally made by him the section gives a wide discretion to the court to either grant or to withhold its consent. The discretion must, however, be exercised in a judicial manner and not in an arbitrary way, because consent by the court is not an empty formality and is not to be given in all cases as a matter of routine While exercising its discretion to grant its consent to the withdrawal, the court has to form its own independent opinion upon consideration of the materials appearing on the record or upon circumstances extraneous to the record of the case, if any. The circumstances extraneous to the record of the case must, however, be such as to satisfy the judicial conscience of the court. The mere fact that the Assistant Public Prosecutor has been instructed by the Government or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, to apply for withdrawal is not a valid reason for the court to give its consent to the withdrawal. As the court is required under the law to perform a judicial act in giving its consent to the wtlhdrawal of the prosecution, it can ask from the Public Prosecutor the reasons for the withdrawal,if he has omitted to state them in his application) in order to satisfy its judicial conscience whether the Public Prosecutor has not improperly or arbitrarily exercised his discretion or has not made an attempt to obstruct the normal course of justice contrary to the interests of administration thereof. Reference in this connection may be made to the authority of the Supreme Court in M N S. Nair vs. P. V. Balakrishnan,supra) wherein their Lordships laid down certain guidelines to be followed by the courts while exercising their discretion in granting consent to the withdrawal. The observations of their Lordships are quoted below in extenso: - "it appears to us that the wide and general powers which are conferred under S. 494 on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution though they are subject to the permission of the Court have t be exercised by him in relation to the facts and circumstances of that case in furtherance of rather than as a dindrance to the object of the law and jusified on the material in the case which substantiate the grounds alleged not necessarily from those gathered by the judicial method but on other materials which may not be strictly on legal or admissible evidence. The court also while considering the request to grant permission under the said section should not do so as a necessaryformality the grant of it for the mere asking. It may do so only if it is satisfied on the materials placed before it that the grant of it subserves the administration of justice and that permission was not being sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further and maintain. " Judged from these principles, the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalore, refusing to give his consent to the withdrawal appears to be improper, as he had made no attempt to exercise his discretion in the matter on sound legal principles If she grounds for the withdrawal were not stated by the Assistant Public Prosecutor in his application, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was entitled to ask from him the reasons for the withdrawal in order to enable himself to perform the judicial act of granting or withholding his consent to the withdrawal. It is no doubt true that consent is not required to be given in all cases as a matter of routine but it should not be withheld unreasonably without judicial consideration of all the circumstances or materials on which action may be taken in a particular case under section 494, Old Cr. P. C.