LAWS(RAJ)-1978-11-18

DEEPCHAND AND SONS Vs. MOHAN DAS

Decided On November 10, 1978
DEEPCHAND AND SONS Appellant
V/S
MOHAN DAS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question of law that arises in this revision application is as to whether the suit filed by the tenant for fixation of standard rent was maintainable or not? The facts leading to the filing of the present revision petition may be briefly stated: There was a big shop belonging to the plaintiff applicant situated in the city of Kota. In Feb. 1970, the shop was vacated by the erstwhile tenant thereof and thereafter the landlord constructed partition walls dividing the one big shop into four smaller shops and fixed separate doors on each one of these four shops. The plaintiff opposite party took one of these four shops on rent from the plaintiff landlord in April 1970, on a monthly rent of Rs. 175, Sometime after taking one such shop on rent, the tenant filed a suit for fixation of standard rent in the Court of Additional Munsif, alleging that the bigger shop, which now consisted of four separate shops, was earlier rented out to Hemandas Liladhar on a monthly rent of Rs. 71 and that should be considered as the basic rent of the premises in dispute. The landlord defendant took an objection in his written statement that the suit was not maintainable because the premises which were constructed on or after 1st June, 1951 were exempted from the application of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), for a period of seven years from the date of such completion. The trial court accepted the contention of the landlord defendant and held that as the shop in dispute was constructed in April 1970, the Act was not applicable to it and the suit for fixation of standard rent thereof was not maintainable. Thus, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed on the aforesaid preliminary ground.

(2.) The plaintiff-tenant filed an appeal, which was heard by the Additional Civil Judge, No. 1, Kota. The appellate court by its order dated Feb. 12, 1974 took the view that as the entire earlier construction was not demolished and merely some structural changes were made, the same could not be termed as new construction within the meaning of Sub-clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, The appeal was, therefore, allowed as it was held that the suit was maintainable and the case was remanded to the trial court for decision of the remaining issues, after taking evidence of the parties. It is against this order that the present revision application has been preferred in this Court. The relevant provisions, with which I am concerned in this case, may be reproduced for ready reference:

(3.) It may also be useful here to refer to the relevant portion of the definition of 'premises' contained in Clause (v) of Section 3 of the Act, which runs as under: -