KHAMMA DEVI Vs. DOLI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision application has been filed by Smt. Khamma Dew, widow of Lalchand in her own capacity as well as in the capacity as a natural guardian of defendants Nos. 3 to 7 against the order of the Munsif, Balotra, dated March 2, 1977 passed in Civil Original Suit No. 35 of 1975.

(2.) A few facts deserve to be recalled lied here. Smt. Doli Devi widow of Hiralal (plaintiff -non petitioner No. 1 instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 4,000/ - against Maghraj son of Jethmal (defendant No 1. non -petitioner No. 2) and the petitioners in the court of Munsif, Balotra on May 20, 1975. It was alleged that the plaintiff, at the request of Lalchand (husband of petitioner No. 1 defendant No. 2) and father of defendants Nos. 3 to 7 (petitioners No. 2 to 6) deposited a sum of Rs. 100/ - on January 24, 1973 and Rs. 2000/ - on January 25, 1973. To these two sums, an amount of Rs. 1000/ - was added as interest and the present suit was instituted as aforesaid. The defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were sued as legal representatives of deceased Lalchand. The defendants denied the plaint averments by filing written -statements i.e., one by defendant No. 2, the other by guardian ad item of defendants Nos. 3 to 7 and the third by defendant No 1. It may be stated that the natural guardian of defendant No. 3 to 7 fails to appear to defend the suit on their behalf and She Hastimal Advocate of Balotra was appointed as their guardian, ad litem. The plaintiff submitted a rejoinder to the written statement submitted on behalf defendants Nos. 2 to 7. The trial court framed issues on July 6, 1976. During the trial on September 14, 1976, a joint application was moved on behalf of defendant No. 2 and defendants Nos. 3 to 7 under Section 4(c) of the Rajasthan Scheduled Debtors (Liquidation of Indebtedness) Act (No. XXIII of 1976) which will hereinafter be referred to as 'the Act'. It was stated in the application that defendants Nos. 2 to 7 are scheduled debtors under the provisions of the Act and they are marginal farmers, that the amount for which the suit has been instituted is not a 'debt' within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act and that as they are marginal farmers, suit against them cannot proceed and the debt stands discharged. It was pared that the; may be discharged from the debt and proceedings against them should be dropped. The plaintiff non petitioner No. 1 contested this application on various grounds. It was alleged by her that the defendants are not agriculturists, that the amount advanced was by way of deposit and not a loan, that the amount was outstanding against defendant No. 1 and the deceased Lal Chand and defendant Nos. 2 to 7 have been sued as legal representatives of deceased Lalchand and therefore they do not fall under the category if debtors in 1 heir individual capacity. In para 4 of the reply it was stated that Lalchand in his statement recorded in execution case No. 382 of 1976 Dhingarmal v. Achaldas stated before the civil Judge that he was principally doing leaden' and that in the sale deed, dated June 5, 1974, a recital was made that the house is being sold for maintaining themselves as they (defendants Nos. 2 to 7) have no other source of livelihood. After the filing of the reply, the Munsif adjourned the case for the disposal of this application to November 4, 1976 On November 4, 976, the case was again adjourned for the disposal of the application Time was sought for arguments be the learned Counsel for the plaintiff on November 18, 1976 and therefore, it was adjourned to November 25, 1976 for the disposal of the application Learned Counsel for the parties took time for arguing the application on November 25, 1976 and December 17, 1976. The arguments could not be heard on January 20, 1977 and February 14, 1977 It appears from the order sheet dated February 24, 1977 that the arguments were heard on this application and then the case was fixed for others on March 2, 1977, the application of the defendant under Section 4(c) of the Act was dismissed with costs amounting to Rs. 30/ -.

(3.) MR . Chopra contended (i) that the trial court has misdirected itself in holding that the petitioners are not agriculturists within the meaning of sec 2(b) of the Act and (ii) that the trial court has erroneously found that the salt is not for the recovery of debt as defined in Section 2,(e) of the Act.