SATYANARAIN Vs. BAJRANGLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision application has been preferred by the tenant (defendant petitioner) against the order dated February 18, 1978 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhilwara, by which he accepted the application of the landlord (plaintiff non petitioner) under O. VI r. 17, C. P. C. dated January 7, 1978.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this revision petition are these, -

(3.) MR. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner further argued that the trial court has, while deciding issue No. 3, dealt with the question of denial of the title of the landlord. In the memo of appeal filed by the plaintiff-landlord in the lower appellate court, the finding in this regard has also been assailed and in these circumstances, the amendment of the plaint by adding an additional ground of denial of the title of the landlord was not at all warranted. His further submission was that the lower appellate court did not apply its mind to this aspect of the matter that amendments in the plaint sought for by the plaintiff-non-petitioner was necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties as required by O. VI r. 17, C P. G. He invited my attention to the amendment application and argued that the defaults have also not been specified in the application as is clear from para 3 (B which was sought to be added to the plaint. His submission in this regard was that these defaults have occurred during the pendency of the suit and therefore, on the basis of these defaults, ejectment cannot be claimed. According to him the dates of default give rise to a fresh cause of action accruing in favour of the plaintiff-non-petitioner, with regard to the ground of denial of the title of the landlord, he argued that denial must be anterior to the suit and therefore, the alleged denial in the written statement filed in the suit instituted by the plaintiff-non-petitioner cannot be made an additional ground for ejectment. In this connection, he cited Maharaja of Jeypore vs. Rukmani Pattamahdevi (6), (Mir) Haidar vs. Jankiram (7), Salla Edu Musalman vs. Jainab Bi (8 , Mahendra Singh vs. Rogra (9) and Ratanlal Manickchand Shah vs. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi (10 ). His submission is that defaults under Sec. 13 (1) (a) and denial of title of the landlord in the written-statement constituted separate and independent cause of action and as such on the basis of the cause of action relating to defaults and denial of title of the landlord, the amendment of the plaint should not have been permitted by the lower appellate court. In order to substantiate the arguments as to what is the cause of action, he relied on the decisions reported in Mohammed Khalil Khan vs. Mahbub Ali Mian (11), State of Madras vs. G. P. Agencies (12), Sahu Vanas-pati Traders vs. Union of India (13), Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram (14) and M/s Ganesh Trading Go. vs. Moji Ram (15 ). While assailing the order under revision, he vehemently argued that the learned Additional District Judge should not have exercised his discretion in favour of the plaintiff-non-petitioner, for, the application for amendment was highly belated. In this connection, he submitted that the suit was filed on November 10, 1972. The defendant petitioner submitted his written statement on May 25, 1973. After trial, the suit for ejectment was dismissed on September 20, 1976 The plaintiff preferred appeal before the District Judge on October 16, 1976. The arguments in the appeal were heard on January 5, 1978 and thereafter, the appeal was posted for judgment by the learned Additional District Judge. On January 7, 1978, the application for amendment was moved. In these circumstances, because of the inordinate delay, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner argued that the learned Additional District Judge should have rejected the application. Strong reliance was placed on Gauri Shanker vs. M/s Hindustan Trust & Co. (16) and Smt. Gangabai vs. Vijay Kumar (17) to show that the plaintiff was guilty of gross delay and laches and as such, the learned Additional District Judge should not have allowed him to take additional grounds in the plaint by way of amendment. He tried to distinguish Prem Lal's case (4) on the basis of which the learned Additional District Judge allowed the amendment of the plaint. He also tried to persuade me that the decision reported in Prem Lal's case (4) requires reconsideration and therefore, at any rate, the matter should be referred to a Larger Bench.