MAKHAN LAL Vs. URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST JAIPUR CITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Jaipur City dated 8th December, 1976.

(2.) THE brief facts, which are relevant for the disposal of this revision petition, are that the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur City filed a suit against Makhan Lal, Rajmal and Kailash Narain for declaration and possession. THE suit was valued at Rs. 10,000/ -. Defendants No. 1 and 2 filed their written statements on 25th March, 1976, while the defendant No. 3 filed his written statement on 3rd April, 1976 Defendants No. 1 and 2 raised issue that the valuation of the suit property is Rs. 50,000/-, while the plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 10,000/. It was, therefore, contended that the court-fee paid is insufficient and that if the suit is valued at Rs 50,000/-, then the subject-matter of the suit is liable to be tried by the District Judge, and the Additional Civil Judge will have no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit.

(3.) IT has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the learned lower Court has erred in law in deciding the issue No. 9 in favour of the plaintiff. IT has been contended that even in para No. 17 of the plaint, it has been stated that the court-fees is paid as provided under Section 24 (a) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). IT was further contended that as the suit relates to the cancellation of the decree and the registered instrument of sale and as the possession of the suit property is sought along with declaration of its ownerships the suit was liable to be valued in accordance with Section 24 (a) of the Act, and not in accordance with section 38 of the Act. IT was further contended that Section 9 of the Act provides that a document falling within two or more descriptions in this Act shall where the fees chargeable thereunder are different, be chargeable only with the highest of such fees. IT was also contended that as the plaintiff was neither a party to the original suit No. 72/1972, nor was a party to the execution of the registered sale-deed dated 6ih May, 1975, the court-fees shall be chargeable under Section 24 (a), and not under Section 38 of the Act.