SHAH PUKH RAJ Vs. CHIMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is defendant's appeal from the judgment and decree of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Sirohi dated the 13th of July, 1954, confirming the judgment and decree of the Munsif, Bali dated the 24th of November, 1953, by which the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for an amount of Rs. 2000/- with costs. The only point that is now canvassed in this appeal is that the firm of the plaintiffs not having been registered as required by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the suit is not maintainable and is barred by the provision of sec. 69 of the partnership Act. It is conceded on either side that the plaintiffs' firm is a partnership firm. The case of the plaintiffs is that the cause of action in this case arose before the extension of the India partnership Act to Rajasthan and his remedy is therefore, not barred by sec. 69 of the Act.

(2.) THERE is some difference of opinion among the various High courts in India. The Calcutta, patna and, Lahore High Courts are of the view that provision of sec. 69 is procedural and is therefore retrospective in its operation and sec. 74 applies to pending proceeding only and does not apply to causes of action which accrued before the coming into force of the Act and for which suits are instituted afterwards. Vide Surendra Nath De vs. Manohar De (1), Shazad Khan vs. Darbar Babu Kuchhi (2) Firm Krishen Lal Ramlal vs. Abdula Ghafur Khan (3 ). At one time the Allahabad High Court concurred with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Nath De's case. That decision is in the case of Firm, Danmal Purshotam Dass vs. Firm, Babu Ram Chhote Lal (4 ). Later on the Allahabad High Court has disapproved its earlier view and in the case of Ram-gopal Sriniwas vs. Netram (5) followed the view expressed by the Bombay and Madras High Courts. The Bombay High Court in Revappa Nandappa Hattarki vs. Babu Sidappa Erandole (6) and the Madras High Court in S. Girdharilal Son and Co. vs. B. Kappini Gowder (7) have held firstly, that the provision of sec. 69 cannot considered to be one of mere procedure and that the provision of sec. 74 could save causes of action which accrued before the coming into force of the Act and its scope was not limited to pending proceedings only. The same view has been accepted in Firm, Narmada Ginning and press Factory Co. vs. Kastoormal Deokaran (8), Syed Faqir Hussain vs. Chandra Bai (g), Hiralal Gulabchand Shop; Bhusawal vs. Amarchand Kisanlal Shop (10) and Soonoiram Ramniranjandas vs. Junjila (11 ).