LAWS(RAJ)-1958-11-6

MRS LEELA JAIN Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Decided On November 07, 1958
LEELA JAIN Appellant
V/S
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THE case, as disclosed by the petitioner, is that she was the owner of a plot No. J 39 in 'c Scheme, (now known as Ashok Nagar) Jaipur, and she built a house thereon after obtaining proper sanction of the Municipal Council, Jaipur. As it happened, slight variations were made, as the construction proceeded, and these were objected to by the Municipal Council at the instance of respondents No. 3, Shri D. D. Goswami, who had his house on the adjoining plot. It was alleged that the Municipal Council compounded the action of the petitioner subject to payment of Rs. 101/-by order of the Chairman dated 24th October, 1956. THE money was remitted by the petitioner. Respondent No. 3, Shri D. D. Goswami filed a revision, which was heard by the Deputy Minister, Local Self Government, on 31-st January, 1957, but the petitioner was not informed of the decision. THE petitioner lived at Kanpur, and got information from his relations in Jaipur on 22nd April, 1957, that the overseer of the Municipal Council with police force and 20 other persons had come to the house of the petitioner, and started demolition of the front portion and the staircase, which action, if completed, would have resulted in the front portion of the building to collapse, and in causing injuries to the tenants who were occupying the house. THE work of demolition was, however, stopped by the personal intervention of one of the Ministers of the Government, and the petitioner learnt that the revision petition filed by respondent No. 3 to the Government had been allowed on the 17th April, 1957, and it was in pursuance of that order of the Government that the demolition of the petitioner's house had been undertaken. THE petitioner submitted that the order of the Government directing demolition of his building was illegal on various grounds mentioned in the petition, and should, therefore, be set aside.

(3.) THE effect of the proviso by reference to sec. 3 and 4, therefore, is that is cases where appeal is provided by the main Act, such appeal shall lie to the Commissioner. No appeal shall lie from an order of the Commissioner in appeal, but against such appellate decision a revision may lie to the Government. In order that a revision can lie, the first requisite is, therefore, that the order should be an appealable one. If the order is appealable, there can be an appeal to the Commissioner, and against the decision of the Commissioner a revision will lie to the Government. But if the order is not appealable, then there can be neither an appeal nor a revision to the Government. If this were not so, and the proviso to sec. 4 (1) be read as giving a power to the Government to exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of every order passed by a Commissioner a Municipal Authority, the whole edifice of a Local Self-Government would tumble to pieces. Act III of 1950 was enacted to provide unformity of procedure, and it appears by reference sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 that according to the Acts applicable to certain cities, appeal from an appellate order was also permissible. THE Government, however, did not propose to continue the provision of second appeals, and these second appeals were to be transferred to the Government to be disposed of as revisions. If every order of every municipal authority were to be treated as revisable by virtue of the proviso to sec. 4, the interference of the Government would be sought in every order made by any municipal authority, and the municipal affairs would come to be conducted not by Municipal Committee but by the Government. A careful consideration of these provisions, therefore does not leave any room for doubt that the order being not appealable, the Government had no power to revise the order of the Municipal President passed in the case, and the petitioner is entitled to succeed. THE order of the Government is without jurisdiction and must be quashed on this ground alone. It is not necessary to go into the other grounds raised in this petition.