S B CHATURVEDI Vs. G C CHATTERJEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of Shri G. C. Chatterji as Vice Chancellor of the university of Rajputana in November, 1956. The applicant's case is briefly this. Shri Chat-terji was appointed Vice Chancellor in 1953 and his term of office was to expire on the 31st of October, 1956. The procedure for the appointment of the Vice Chancellor is contained in section 12 of the University of Rajputana Act, 1946 as amended up to date (hereinafter called the Act ). When the term of Shri Chatterji was to run for a few months more, a meeting of the Syndicate of the University was called and a resolution was passed recommending the reappointment of Shri Chatterji as Vice Chancellor for a second term of three years in continuation of his first term from 1st of November, 1956. In pursuance of this resolution, the Chancellor of the University appointed Shri chatterji as Vice Chancellor for a second term of three years from 1st of november, 1956. The contention of the applicant is that the reappointment without following the procedure prescribed in section 12 (1) of the Act was invalid and, therefore, this court should issue a writ of quo warranto after holding this appointment invalid.

(2.) THE application has been opposed by the opposite parties, who are the Vice-Chancellor, the Chancellor and the Syndicate of the University and University itself. It is contended on their he-half that where a reappointment is being made under Section 12 (2) of the Act in continuation of the first appointment, all that is necessary is an order of reappointment by the Chancellor and the procedure provided by Section 12 (1) of the Act need not be followed. It is also urged that the applicant has not exhausted all his remedies under the Act and, therefore, this court should not intervene in his favour at this stage. Lastly the motives of the applicant in impugning the appointment are also challenged and it is urged that if the motives are not clean, this court should not interfere.

(3.) WE shall first consider the question whether the applicant has exhausted all his remedies under the Act. In this connection reference was made to section 8 (A) of the Act which lays down that the President of India shall be the Visitor of the university. It is also laid down in that section that the Visitor shall have the right to cause an inquiry to be made in respect of any matter connected with the university. After such inquiry the Visitor may address the Vice-Chancellor with reference to the result of the inquiry and the Vice-Chancellor has to communicate to the Senate the views of the Visitor with such advice which the visitor may be pleased to offer upon the action to be taken thereon. The Senate shall then communicate through the Vice Chancellor to the Visitor such action, if any, as is proposed to fee taken upon the result of the inquiry. But where the Senate does not, within reasonable time, take action to the satisfaction of the visitor he may after considering any explanation furnished or representation made by the Senate, issue such directions as he may think Fit and the Senate shall comply with such directions. It is contended on behalf of the opposite parties that the applicant should have approached the Visitor under this provision and only after the Visitor had failed to give him satisfaction that he. could come to this court. Reliance in this connection is placed on R. v. Dunsheath; Ex parte Meredith 1950-2 all ER 741. That' was a case relating to the University of London and the question there was about the summoning of an extra-ordinary meeting of the convocation by the Chairman. A requisition as required by the statutes was made to the chairman of the convocation, but the latter refused to call the meeting. Thereupon the requisitionists approached the court for a writ of mandamus on the Chairman. The application was refused on the ground that where an officer of the University had refused to perform a duty placed on him by the statutes of the University it was a domestic matter and, therefore, one essentially for the Visitor. In the course of the judgment it was observed that,