LAWS(RAJ)-2018-7-23

DINESH ARORA Vs. VIBHORE KAPOOR AND ANR.

Decided On July 18, 2018
Dinesh Arora Appellant
V/S
Vibhore Kapoor And Anr. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Under challenge is the order dated 12.09.2017 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in Civil Suit No.426/2013 whereby the two applications filed by the petitioner-tenant-defendant (hereinafter 'tenant'), one under Section 21 of the Act of 2001 (hereinafter 'the Act of 2001') read with Section 151 CPC dated 30.01.2014 and the other under Section 15 (4) of the Act of 2001 read with Section 21 of the Act of 2001 have been dismissed.

(2.) The Rent Tribunal in its impugned order has negating the tenant's case held that the rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord-plaintiff (hereinafter 'landlord') be taken on record as on reply to the eviction filed on 25.11.2013, the Rent Tribunal had fixed the date of 04.01.2014 for filing the rejoinder when the rejoinder, actually came to be filed.

(3.) The case of the tenant before the Rent Tribunal as also before this court advocated by Mr.Anil Upman is that in terms of Section 15 (4) of the Act of 2001, the petitioner could file a rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition only within a period of 30 days from the date of the reply being filed. He submitted that admittedly reply having been filed on 25.11.2013 the rejoinder in terms of Section 15 (4) of the Act of 2001 had to be filed on or before 24.12.2013 but was filed on 04.01.2014--after about forty days and could not be taken on record. Mr.Anil Upman further submitted that in fact the Rent Tribunal has no authority to extend the time for filing a rejoinder beyond the time provided under Section 15 (4) of the Act of 2001. He submitted that the period of 30 days for filing a rejoinder constitutes a special limitation which excludes by implication, the provision of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter 'the Act of 1963'). Mr.Anil Upman submitted that even otherwise the rejoinder could not have taken on record for reasons of the fact that there was no application for condonation of delay beyond 30 days following the filing of the reply by resort to Section 5 of the Act of 1963, even if the Act of 1963 were to apply. Mr.Anil Upman relied upon the judgment in the case of Nasirudin and Others v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003 (1) RCR 337) in support of his contention.