KARAN SINGH Vs. BALWANT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for damages amounting to Rs. 25,000/-, against the defendant- respondent, with the averment that the plaintiff-appellant on 30. 9. 1981, was posted as Station House Officer at Srimadhopur and was to retire on the same date, that at the relevant time, respondent Dr. Balwant Singh was the concerned Deputy Inspector General of Police for the area comprising Srimadhopur; that a departmental enquiry was pending agaisnt him (the plaintiff- appellant) and the defendant-respondent was the Disciplinary Authority in the capacity of Deputy Inspector General of Police; that the defendant-respondent acted with malice and undue haste and passed the order dated 30. 9. 1981, holding the plaintiff- appellant liable for the charges, levelled against him and passed the order of punishment, whereby, the plaintiff was reverted from the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police to the lower rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police; that the matter was carried in an appeal and in the appeal, the punishment of reversion was set aside by the Inspector General of Police, vide the order dated 3. 9. 1982; and that the order of reversion, passed by the defendant- respondent, was contrary to the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be called as "the CCA Rules") and caused him great mental, physical and financial loss, which was quantified at Rs. 25,000/- , for which, the suit was filed. In the written-statement, the averments made in the plaint, were denied. It has been contended that as many as 15 charges were levelled against the plaintiff- appellant and an enquiry u/r. 16 of the CCA Rules, was conducted. THE Enquiry Officer found 10 charges proved fully and 2 charges proved partially. On the relevant date, the matter came up before the defendant- respondent and the order of reversion of the plaintiff-appellant, was passed. It has been further contended in the written- statement that the case of the plaintiff, was based on the discharge of official duties by the defendant-respondent, and as such, in the absence of the State of Rajasthan being impleaded as a party to the suit, the suit itself, is not maintainable.

(2.) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed as many as 7 issues. The Issue No. 3 is as under:- "whether the State Government is a necessary party to the suit and for this reason this suit is not maintainable?" This Issue No. 3 was tried as a preliminary issue, being purely a legal one. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 28. 5. 1987, found that the State was a necessary party to the suit, in terms of O. 27, R. 5-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter to be called as "the CPC"), as the suit for damages was based on the action of the defendant-respondent acting in his official capacity. The learned trial Court also found that at this belated stage, the application of the plaintiff-appellant, filed on 8. 4. 1986, for impleading the State as a party to the suit, could not be admitted, as the suit against the State Government was beyond limitation on the date of the application. Aggrieved by the order/judgment of the learned trial Court dated 28. 5. 1987, the plaintiff-appellant filed an appeal in this Court, u/s. 96 of the CPC the said appeal came to be heard and decided o n 7. 12. 1993, by the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the appeal with costs. Feeling aggrieved by the afore- said order and judgment dated 7. 12. 1993, this special appeal has been preferred.

(3.) OBVIOUSLY, the Issue No. 3 is not dependent on the Issue No. 2. A suit against a defendant may be maintainable, yet, the State Government may be a necessary party. Order 27, R. 5-A CPC, does not make a suit for damages against a public ser- vant non- maintainable. It simply provides that where the relief sought, is in respect of the act done by him in his official capacity, State is to be joined as a party. Thus, the question as to whether the State Government is a necessary party or not, is quite independent of the question as to whether the suit against the defendant, is maintainable or not. To our mind, therefore, the above-said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, is not tenable.