LAXMAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have beard Mr. Mridul Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor.

(2.) THIS is a bail application which has been filed by Laxman Singh for his release on bail pending trial of Sessions case No. 36/85 pending against him, in which he has been charged for the offence under Sections 302, 449 and 458, IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. He moved before Sessions Court, Merta for the grant of bail but the Sessions Judge dismissed his application on 19th January, 1987. He has, therefore moved to this Court for grant of bail. The main contention of Mr. Mridul Jain is that charge had been framed against the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Merta, on March 4, 1986 after the case had been committed to him by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Merta on 19th December, 1985. The occurrence took place on 11th August, 1984. The petitioner was arrested on 20th September, 1985. Prior to that petitioner was absconding for more than one year, charge -sheet was filed before the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate in October, 1985 and the Magistrate had passed the committal order on 2nd November, 1985. It has been argued by Mr. Mridul Jain that the first date fixed for recording of prosecution evidence was 15th May, 1986 and till 11th March, 1987 i.e. for the last about 10 months, not a single witness has been examined by the prosecution in the Sessions case, pending before the Sessions Judge, Merta. The petitioner is already in jail for the last 1 -1/2 years. It was contended that this fact alone entitles him to be released on bail because delay in trial without progress for about 11 months violates the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution to the petitioner as it deprives him of his personal liberty except in accordance with law. It was urged that provisions of the Cr. PC envisage speedy trial within a reasonable time and when the prosecution does not produce a single witness for about ten months, the petitioner becomes entitled to be released on bail and his fundamental right should be secured.

(3.) HIS Lordship observed in para 9 of the reported judgment that in all criminal prosecutions, the rights to a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of the citizen under Article 21 of our Constitution. That cannot be allowed to be whittled down on any whims ground of the horry origin of this right in the constitutional history of Great Britain and America nor considerations of affluence of developed countries are even remotely relevant or germane in this context. That this right to speedy trial delves deeply into the soul and spirit of the Anglo -American jurisprudence (which we have either inherited or borrowed from both in the fields of constition and the legal system) is indeed manifest. Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Peter H. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina (196') 18 Law Ed. 2nd 1 : 386 US 213 stated that we hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. This right has its roots at the very foundation of our English Law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written. 'We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right, but evidence of recognition of the right to speedy justice' in even earlier times is found in the Assilze of Clarendon (1166). By the late thirteenth century, justices, armed with commissions of goal delivery and/or over and terminer were visiting the country side three times a year. These Justices, Sir Edward Coke wrote in Part -H of his Institutes 'have not suffered the prisoner to be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice...without detaining long in prison. In all capital or criminal prosecutions, the Viginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided a man both a right...to a speedy trial.' There is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and, at times in opposition to the interests of the accused.