BHAGWAN DAS BHARGAVA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) FACTS leading to this petition are that the Special Police Establishment Jaipur had filed a charge sheet against the petitioner and Ashok Kumar Bhatnagar alleging that they had committed offences under Section 420, 468, 471 read with Section 120B, I.P.C. This charge sheet was submitted in the court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (SPE) cases), Jaipur on August 29, 1986. On that date the petitioner Bhagwandas Bhargava and the other co -accused Ashok Kumar Bhatnagar were present in the court. They filed a bail application which was accepted and the petitioner and the other co -accused were ordered to be released on bail on their furnishing surety of the amount of Rs. 5,000/ - and a personal bond for appearance in that court. The case was then adjourned to November, 5, 1986 for hearing of arguments on the question of framing the charge. Before that date, Bhagwandas filed the present petition in this Court on October 27, 1986. In this petition, the petitioner has detailed his defence to the charge sheet submitted by the Special Police Establishment The allegations against the petitioner as alleged in the charge sheet are that certain recruitment to two posts of Chaukidar and one post of barber was made in the Saink Hospital, Jaipur on March 13 and 14, 1984, on the basis of bogus and fictitious lists purporting to be of Employment Exchange, Jaipur. It was alleged that Hardeo, Vijay Kumar and Shamlal Thakur who were being given the employment on the aforesaid dates had paid illegal gratification of Rs. 2,500/ -, Rs. 3,500/ - and Rs. 5.000/ - for getting the employment to the petitioner who had arranged to obtain fictitious list of candidates introducing the above named persons to the employer for employment. Even the certificates of education at qualifications were bogus and fictitious.

(2.) THE petitioner narrates in para 5 of his petition the version which is not the prosecution story, but his own version about the truth of the matter. According to the petitioner, the three persons employed were connected with the military officials like Lt. Col. M. Jaya Rao and members of the Selection Board and were residing in the Government accommodation before their appointment. A complaint had been made by G.D.R. Kaman Singh and Ex -service man with the Appointing Authority in the first week of March, 1984 regarding this recruitment whereby persons concerned i.e. Dr. Bhagat Singh and Capt. R.S. Yadav employed the above three persons on the basis of forged educational certificates and despite the fact that the vacancies were reserved for scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. The petitioner states that he is innocent and that the real persons who committed the offences have not been prosecuted.

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied -upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswami and Ors. reported in : 1977CriLJ1125 and on the basis of this judgment, he contended that in exercise of the wholesome powers contained in Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court. However, the law has to be applied on the facts of each case. The facts in the above Supreme Court case were that accused No. I in that case was an employee of the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. He was dismissed from service on the allegation that he had assaulted a canteen Supervisor. The complainant Ajit Dutt attempted to serve the dismissal order on accused No. 1, but he refused to accept it and threatened the complainant that the latter was primarily responsible for his dismissal and he would have to answer the consequence. It was alleged that the I.T.I. Employees' Union took up cudgels on his behalf and resolved to support his cause. The case of the prosecution was that accused Nos. 1 and 8 to 20 conspired to commit the murder of the complainant and that in pursuance of that conspiracy accused Nos I, 8 and 10 hired accused No. 2 a notorious criminal to execute the object of the conspiracy. Accused No. 2 in turn engaged the services of accused Nos. 3 to 7 and ultimately accused Nos. 1 to 6 were alleged to have assaulted the complainant with knives thereby committing offence under Sections 324, 226 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Accused No. 2 was charged separately under Section 307 or in the alternative under Section 326 Penal Code. The Metropolitan Magistrate directed all the 20 accused to face their trial before the Sessions Court for offences under Sections 324, 326 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. At the commencement of the trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, two preliminary questions were raised one by the prosecution and the other by the accused. On behalf of the prosecution, it was contended before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Banglore, that the committal order did not preclude the court of Sessions from framing a new charge under section 120B of the Penal Code On the other hand, it was contended by the accused that there were no sufficient grounds for proceeding with the prosecution and they ought to be discharged. The Additional Sessions Judge upheld the contention of the prosecution that he had the power to frame the charge under Section 120B. No doubt, the court of Sessions, when a case is committed, has power to frame an appropriate charge and its powers are not restricted by the specifications contained in the committal order. So far as the contention on behalf of the accused before the Additional Sessions Judge was concerned, the Judge accepted it partly. He held that there was no case against accused Nos. 11, 12 and 16 and that they were entitled to be discharged. By an order, the Additional Sessions Judge discharged the above three accused. After discharging them, the Additional Sessions Judge turning to the case against the remaining accused, observer that there was 'some material to hold that they have had some thing to do with the incident which occurred on December 6, 1973 in the I.T.I. Colony, Banglore.' The Addl. Sessions Judge adjourned the case to September 1, 1975 'for framing specific charges as made out from the material on record against the rest of the accused persons.' Two revision petitions were filed by different accused persons before the High Court and it was contended before the High Court that there were no sufficient ground for proceeding against them. The High Court allowed these revision petitions and quashed proceedings in regard to accused Nos 10, 13, 14, 15 and 17 to 20 who had filed the two revision petitions. The State of Karnataka, by special leave appealed to the Supreme Court and the contention advanced was that the High Court ought not to have exercised its powers to quash the proceedings against the above accused persons without giving to the Sessions Court, which was seized of the case, an opportunity to consider whether there was sufficient material on the record on which to frame charges against them. It was argued that the Sessions Court had adjourned the case for consideration of that very question and was not proper for the High Court to withdraw the case as it were and to exercise its extra -ordinary powers thereby preventing the trial court from examining the sufficiency of the material which was the primary duty and function of that court to examine. It is important to note here that their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that 'there is some apparent justification for this grievance because the language in which the Sessions Court couched its order would seem to suggest that it had adjourned the case to September 1, 1975. for consideration of the question as to whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the respondents.' These observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that interference should not be made where the concerned court has still to apply its judicial mind for examining the sufficiency of the material on record to determine whether the accused persons should be discharged or there is sufficient material on the record to frame charge against them. Then their Lordships of the Supreme Court proceeded further to construe carefully the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and observed as under: But on a careful reading of the Sessions Courts judgment would reveal that while discharging accused Nos. II, 12 and 16, it came to the conclusion that in so far as the other accused were concerned, there was some material to hold that they were connected with the incident. The case was, therefore, adjourned by the Court for framing charges against them In other words, the learned Judge adjourned the case not for deciding whether any charge at all could be framed against the remaining accused but for the purpose of deciding as to which charge or charges could appropriately be framed on the basis of the material before him. In the instant, case, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had adjourned the case to November 5 -1986 for arguments to decide whether any charge at all can be framed against the petitioner and his co -accused and not for the purpose of deciding as to which charge or charges can appropriately be framed after making its mind that there was some material to hold that the petitioner and the other co -accused have had something to do with the incident. As a matter of fact, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate heard arguments on this point on November 20 1985 i.e., after this petition had been presented by Bhagwandas Bhargava in this court. To interfered at that stage would clearly amount to circumvent the powers of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate which it had under the Code to apply its judicial mind to examine and consider the question whether the allegations against the petitioner were groundless.or whether there was sufficient material on the record on which charges could be framed against him and the other co -accused. Interfering at that stage neither prevents the abuse of the process of any court and nor secures the ends of justice. The inherent powers should be exercised with circumspection. The above noted Supreme Court, decision therefore does not apply to the facts of the present case. On the other hand, the observations made by their Lordships in para 6 of the reported judgment indicate that had the Additional Sessions Judge not come to the conclusion that there was some material to hold that the accused persons concerned in that case had some thing to do with the incident and had the case not been adjourned only for the purpose of framing specific charges, their Lordships would have taken a different view.