LAWS(RAJ)-1977-3-30

NAR SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

Decided On March 07, 1977
NAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner was working as a 'khalasi' at the Railway Workshop at Jodhpur and he was found in possession of stolen copper weighing 4 600 Kg. He was prosecuted in a criminal court and was ultimately convicted by a Magistrate under sec. 3 of the Indian Railway Property (Unlawful possession) Act, 1966. The Additional Sessions Judge, Jodhpur on appeal, while maintaining the conviction of the petitioner set aside the sentence awarded to him, giving him the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Disciplinary Authority passed an order of removal of the petitioner from service on the basis of his conviction by the criminal court. The petitioner moved a writ petition in this Court which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, along with a batch of other similar writ petitions. This court took the view that Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (herein after referred to as "the Rules") required the Disciplinary Authority to "consider" the circumstances of the case and thereafter pass such order as it deemed fit in the circumstances of the case. It was also held by this Court in Kuldeep Singh vs. Union of India (1) that besides the words "consider the circumstances of the case" occurring in the aforesaid rule, the principles of natural justice also required that the delinquent employee must be given an opportunity of showing his side of the case, if an action was proposed to be taken against such employee under Rule 14 (c) of the Rules. The decision of this Court was substantially confirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of The Divisional Personal Officer, Southern Railway vs. T. R. Challappen etc. (2) and it was held by their Lordships that although the conviction of a delinquent employee could be considered as sufficient proof of misconduct, but the Disciplinary Authority should embark upon a summary enquiry to determine the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee. If upon such enquiry, the concerned authority came to form the opinion that the offence was a trivial one or was of a technical nature, it is open to it not to impose any penalty upon the concerned employee inspite of the conviction by the criminal court. Their Lordships have thus held that the Disciplinary Authority in such cases is required to make a summary enquiry to decide as to what penalty, if any, should be imposed on a delinquent employee. However, their Lordships have added that they should not be understood to lay down that the employees convicted of serious offences could insist on their reinstatement.

(2.) AFTER the aforesaid decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Authority issued its memorandum dated February 7, 1976, calling upon the petitioner to show cause, by making a representation, as to why the penalty of dismissal from service be not imposed him, as he was convicted of a serious charge by a criminal court. The petitioner submitted a representation in answer to this memorandum issued by the Disciplinary Authority and after considering the representation made by the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority by its order dated March 13, 1976 held that as the petitioner was found in possession of stolen railway property and as theft of railway property was a charge of serious nature, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner was not a fit person who should be further retained in service. It wa3, therefore, ordered that the petitioner may be dismissed from service. The Disciplinary Authority rejected the contention of the petitioner that the offence in his case was of trivial nature and it was held that the theft of railway property was a very serious offence, irrespective of the amount involved therein. The petitioner thereupon filed an appeal which was also rejected by the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, who was the competent Appellate Authority. Hence this writ petition.