BHERA Vs. RAMESHWAR LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant-mortgagee from the appellate judgment and decree of the District Judge, Partabgarh, dated 17th May, 1961. The District Judge by that decree partially accepted the appeal of Mst. Naraini Bai who was substituted for the original plaintiff, and dismissed the appeal of the appellant and modified the decree of trial court (Sub Divisional Officer, Nimbahera.) It was directed by the decree that the plaintiff shall get possession of certain fields on payment of Rs. 209/- only.

(2.) THE material facts may be stated as follows: - One Nathu son of Roopa Mali of Chhoti Sadri owned agricultural property described in para 1 of the plaint. He mortgaged the property with possession for Rs. 955/8/- in the Samvat year 1966 under a unregistered deed with Pannalal, Gopal, and Phoolchand Bohras of Chhoti Sadri. After the death of the mortgagees their widows Mst. Hangami, Mst. Tulchhi and Mst. Raji transferred mortgagee-rights in respect of two khasras Nos. 288 and 289 for Rs. 218/- to the defendant Bhera Lohar on Jeth Sudi 3 Samvat year 1965, under a deed which also was not registered. THE rest of the fields were sub-mortgaged by the above ladies with one Megha Gadri of Chhoti Sadri on the same date. Initially Hema son of Bakhta Mali claiming to be the heir of Roopa Mali filed a suit on 12/9/50 in the Court of Munsif at Chhoti Sadri against Moolchand, his wife Mst. Chandi Bai, Bhera s/o Churalal Luhar Kishan, Sitaram and Onkar Lal sons of Mangilal Gadri for the redemption of the agricultural holding. THE suit was subsequently transferred under orders of the High Court to the Court of the Sub Divisional Officer at Nimbahera. A question of proprietory title was raised in the case and the issue was referred for decision to the Munsif who gave a finding in favour of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit Hema plaintiff assigned his interest in the property to Heeralal Suthar of Chhotisadri, who was allowed to continue the suit under order 22, rule 10, Civil P. C. THE plaintiff settled the matter with the other defendants and with drew the claim against defendants Nos. I, 2, 4, 5, & 6. THE suit, however, proceeded against Bhera in respect of two fields Nos. 288 and 289 only. THE defendant Bhera denied the plaintiff's claim in toto and denied the mortgage and claimed possession since 1940. He also pleaded that he had planted some trees in the area. He also denied that the plaintiff was the heir of Nathu and that he had no right to file the suit. Various other pleas were taken.

(3.) IT will be useful to point out at this stage that there was no law of Limitation in force in the former State of Mewar before the promulgation of the present Act. There was also no Registration Act, although it was stated at the Bar that some circulars had been issued in the matter of registration of documents. The Law of Limitation introduced for the first time makes a radical departure from the Indian Law of Limitation in one important aspect. While under the Indian Limitation Act the Court is bound to dismiss a suit or appeal filed after the expiry of the limitation the Mewar Limitation Act makes no similar provision. Art. 2 of the Mewar Limitation Act enjoins upon the Court to inform the defendant or the respondent that the suit or appeal is time barred and that he can plead limitation and the Court can dismiss the suit or appeal only if the defendant wants to take such plea. IT appears that the legislature permitted the parties to waive limitation having regard to the popular notions about the pleas of limitation. The Limitation Act contains a very few articles as compared with the then Indian Limitation Act. Having regard to all these circumstances and bearing in mind the principles warranting a proper compromise between the letter of the law and the object of the law in arriving at a conclusion as to the plain meaning of a statutory provision, I have been persuaded to come to the conclusion that the language of Art. 2 is plain and admits of only one reasonable construction that it applies to all suits for redemption and recovery of immovable property mortgaged arising out of any kind of document. Having reached this conclusion, I must add that it is a well settled law that the question of consequences anomalous or otherwise is relevant only when the provisions sought to be construed are reasonably capable of two constructions, but when it is reasonably possible to construe a provision in more than one ways, the Court should have no concern with the results which may ensue from giving effect to the plain meaning of the provision. Ordinary and natural meaning cannot be per. mitted to be effected by supposed anomalies. This is particularly so in interpreting the statute of limitation as the rules of limitation in the very nature of things are arbitrary and a search for reason or equity behind them may not always be fruitful.