BADRI PRASAD Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PLAINTIFF Badriprasad has been unsuccessful in both the courts below and has preferred this second appeal which arises from the appellate judgment and decree of the learned District Judge of Bharatpur, dated April 12, 1961.

(2.) THE admitted facts are quite sufficient for the disposal of this appeal and may be briefly stated. THE plaintiff carried on business in the former State of Dholpur under the name of M/s. Bhagatsingh Kanhiyalal, which was a joint family firm. THE plaintiff wanted to export 27q maunds of "ghee" from Dholpur to Howrah and for that purpose a permit was required from the Dholpur State. According to an arrangement between the parties, the plaintiff was asked to deposit the customs duty on the export of ghee at the rate of Rs. 22/- per maund, in advance. THE plaintiff therefore deposited Rs. 5,940/- on October 7, 1947, under entry Ex. 29, and a permit was issued three days later, on October 10, 1947, allowing the plaintiff to export 270 maunds of ghee to Howrah. THE permit, in the first instance, was valid upto October 31, 1947, but as there were certain restrictions on the booking of goods by railways, its period was extended upto March 31, 1948. THE ghee, in the meantime, had become old and the plaintiff did not export it. So an application was made by the plaintiff on March 26. 1948, to the Dholpur State authorities, for refund of Rs. 5,940/ -. It seems that nothing happened on that request for quite sometime. Ultimately, the Commissioner of Customs and Excise of the successor State of Rajasthan informed the plaintiff on July 16, 1953, that the refund could not be allowed. THEreafter the plaintiff instituted the present suit on 'july 5, 1956, for the recovery of Rs. 5940/- as the original deposit, and Rs. 2950/8/- on account of interest, making a total of Rs. 8,890/8/ -. THE plaintiff specifically pleaded that it was a case in which the customs duty had only been deposited in advance and that as the ghee was not ultimately exported, the plaintiff was entitled to the refund of the. deposit. In paragraph 13 of the plaint, it was pleaded that the cause of action arose on July 16, 1953, when the Commissioner of Customs and Excise first of all refused to refund the money and that the suit was accordingly governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. At the same time, the plaintiff pleaded that it was entitled to an extension in the time limit for the filing of the suit because of certain alleged acknowledgments of liability on the part of the defendant, but the plaintiff does not now rely on that plea. It was with these averments that the suit was raised against the State of Rajasthan.

(3.) THIS view is supported by the cases which have been cited by Mr. Gupta. Although Ram Ranbijay Prasad Singh vs. Mt. Bachia Kuari (6) was a case which related to the return of the money deposited with an employer as security for good conduct, their Lordships of the Patna High Court, while considering the application - of Art. 145, made the following important observation - "the period from which limitation runs under Art 145 is the date of the deposit or pawn. That means to say that, although no cause of action arose in this particular case at the date of the deposit, yet time was running against the plaintiff or his legal representative. That makes the application of Art. 145 impossible as a general principle. New the Limitation Act provides for time running only after the cause of action has arisen, and I think it may be taken as quite certain that if any other construction than that is to be placed upon a particular Article, it will be clear the Legislature never intended that that Article should apply to the facts of such a case as this. " The weight of this observation is obvious.