TARACHAND Vs. KRISHNA GOPAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS case has been placed before us under the following circumstances.

(2.) KRISHNA Gopal Vyas, opposite party No. 1 filed an application under sec. 17 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (herein-after called the Act) in the court of the City Magistrate, Kotah, that he was a tenant of Moolchand son of Beharilal, opposite party No. 2, and that two rooms belonging to Beharilal in the house, in which he resided as tenant of Beharilal, had fallen vacant and as he needed more accommodation, he be given possession of the said rooms after determining the terms of the tenancy with regard thereto. This appli-cation was contested by Moolchand on several grounds one of which was that the rooms were required by his brother Tarachand and his sister Ramkanti Bai who are appellants in this Court. The city Magistrate granted the application of KRISHNA Gopal on the 24th June, 1963. Tarachand and Ramkanti Bai filed an appeal to the District Magistrate, which was dismissed on the 21st November, 1963. They filed a civil revision application in this Court for setting aside the aforesaid orders of the District Magistrate and the City Magistrate. On the 15th March, 1965, Jagat Narayan J. held that no revision was maintainable under sec. 115 C. P. C. The applicants then converted their application into a criminal revision application which was heard by a learned single Judge and in his view the following question which arose in the case called for decision by a larger bench: "whether a Magistrate exercising powers under sec. 17 of the Act and the District Magistrate exercising powers under sec. 22 (3) of the Act are inferior criminal courts as envisaged by sec. 435 Cr. P. C. and thus their orders are open to revision by the High Court or not?"

(3.) THESE observations, in our humble opinion, cannot be construed that the District Magistrate in that case was not exercising a special power or special jurisdiction. A special power or special jurisdiction may be conferred by any law or any superior authority on any person by describing him as the presiding officer of a court and if there are several courts of equal status on all such officers.