BHONRALAL Vs. GAINDABAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE circumstances which have given rise to this application in revision may briefly be stated as below - Bhonralal and others the plaintiff-applicants purchased the land in dispute from the defendants, the opposite party on 22. 3. 29 and applied for mutation of the sals in their names before the Tehsildar, who dismissed the same on 30. 7. 36 on the ground that the opposite-party denied the receipt of consideration. THEy then filed a suit on 5. 12. 14 presumably under sec. 52 of the Bharatpur State Revenue Code (Act No. II of 1905) before the Collector Deeg, of the former Bharatpur State for a declaration of their title and mutation of their names in place of the opposite party who had admittedly sold the land, got the sale deed registered and delivered possession of the land to them. THE main point which arose for consideration in the case before the trial court was whether the period of limitation in the suit be computed from the date of the registration of the sale or the refusal of mutation. THE trial court after hearing the parties observed that in suits of this nature, the period of limitation was to be computed from the date of the sale and not from the date of the refusal of mutation. Accordingly the suit which was evidently instituted more than 15 years from the date of the registration of the sale-deed, was dismissed as barred by limitation. In appeal, the then Revenue Commissioner of the former Bharatpur State also held the same view and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, as being time-barred. THE plaintiffs went in second appeal to the Board of Revenue of the former United State of Matsya. THE learned member observed that the period of limitation in a case of this nature began to run from 30. 7. 36, i. e. when mutation was refused and the rights of the applicants were invaded and a cause of action accrued to them.- But for the reason that as the suit was instituted on 5. 12. 14, i. e. , more than 6 years from the date when the cause of action arose, it was barred by limitation under art. 120 of the Limitation Act which provides six years for the institution of such suits. Accordingly the appeal was rejected with costs. A review application against the said order prevailed with the same learned Member who in his changed capacity as Addl. Commissioner in the new set up after the formation of Rajasthan allowed it on the ground that the period of limitation was not to be governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act but should be computed as given in the Schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Cole. Accordingly he reheard the appeal. THE learned Addl. Commissioner observed that a reference to the schedule to the Bharatpur State Revenue Code would show that at item No. 13 against secs. 52 to 54 suits of every kind as to biswedari and possession by mortgage, sale and gift, were to be instituted within a period of 15 years. It also pointed out that unfortunately the point of time from which the limitation was to run was not mentioned in the column for 'remarks' but considering the omnibus type of the description of suits and the extraordinarily long period of limitation, the learned Addl. Commissioner thought that it should commence from 22. 3. 29 i. e. the date of the registration of the sale-deed. Applying this principle he again dismissed the appeal on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. It is against this order of the learned Addl. Commissioner that the present revision has been filed before us.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the applicants argued that as there was no period of limitation prescribed for applying for mutation of a sale of land, the vendees who are the applicants before us could apply for mutation as and when they chose. THEy were lawfully in possession of the land since the time the sale had been duly registered and, evidently, they had no apprehension to the effect that the vendor opposite party would ever contest the mutation on the ground of non-receipt of consideration. It was only when the said application for mutation was rejected that a cause of action arose and accordingly the applicants filed the present suit on 5. 12. 44 within the prescribed period of 15 years to be computed from the date of the rejection of the mutation application on 30. 7. 36. It was also urged that it was a well laid principle of law that if the point of time from which the limitation was to run was not specifically mentioned in the schedule as was the case in the present proceedings, it should be construed in favour of the suitor, so as not to deprive him from exercising his rights. THE learned counsel for the opposite party refused these contentions by arguing that in the absence of any clear provisions in the schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Code as to the point of time from which limitation was to run in such cases it should be taken to be 15 years from the date of the registration of the sale deed when the right to sue for the declaration of their title had accrued to the applicants.