DUDUWALA AND CO Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are three applications for issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Industrial Tribunal at Jaipur.

(2.) WE propose to decide them by one judgment as the points raised to them are common. It seems that disputes are going on between Messrs. Duduwala and company on the one hand and their employees on the other, represented by Khan mazdoor Congress, Bhilwara, a registered union of workers. In one of the cases the dispute was referred to the Tribunal on the 16th of June 1956, in the other on the 25th of August 1956 and in the third on the 4th of september 1956. Soon after the parties had appeared before the Industrial tribunal, applications were made both on behalf of the employers and the Union for appearance through certain representatives. The Union applied for appearance through Shri R. P. Ladha, a practising, advocate. The case of the Union was based on Section 36 (1) (b) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, and Shri R. P. Ladha was allowed to represent the Union in view of that provision. The employers, who are the applicants before us, prayed that they might be represented through Shri Y. S. Nahar, also a practising, lawyer, and said that he was competent to represent them under Section 36 (2) (a ). This was opposed by the Union and the Tribunal, while apparently holding that shri Nahar was the Joint Honorary Secretary of the Association of Employers of which Messrs. Duduwala and Company were member and would, therefore, be qualified under Section 36 (2) (a) to represent the employers, did not permit him to do so on the ground that as Shri Nahar was appointed in July 1956 and as the disputes, out of which these two cases arose, had either arisen or been referred to the Tribunal by that time, the appointment of Shri Nahar was to circumvent the law as contained in Section 36 (3), and (4) of the Act. Sub-section (3) prohibits a lawyer from appearing in any conciliation proceedings on before any industrial Court and Sub-section (4) prohibits a lawyer from appearing before a Tribunal unless the other side consents.

(3.) BESIDES this, the employers also wanted to be represented by two other persons, namely, Shri Baldwa and Shri Chandmal Surana, in whose favour they had executed special powers of attorney. The Industrial Tribunal did not allow them on the ground that Section 36 (2) did not permit anyone to represent the employers before it on the basis of a special power of attorney. Aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, Messrs. Duduwala and Company have, filed these three applications.