(1.) Accused-Appellant has laid this appeal under Section 14A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'Act of 1989') to assail impugned order dated 06.10.2017 passed by Special Court (SC/ST Act Cases), Churu (Raj.) (for short, 'learned trial Court') rejecting his bail application in Sessions Case No.47/2012 pending before it. The Sessions Case is founded on FIR No. 260/2012 registered at Police Station Rajgarh, District Churu, wherein after investigation, appellant is charged for offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 IPC.
(2.) It is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that trial was almost complete against appellant but after recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., learned trial Court has allowed the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to proceed against other co-accused Om Prakash for commission of offence, whose name also surfaced during trial. Learned counsel has therefore argued that now learned trial Court shall conduct de novo trial and conclusion of same is likely to take considerable time. It is further argued by learned counsel that appellant is under custody since 01.07.2012. While referring to the evidence, which has come to the fore during trial, learned counsel would contend that essentially the allegations for giving serious blow by wine bottle on the head of deceased are against co-accused Om Prakash. Learned counsel has further submitted that though lathi was recovered from the place of occurrence but its use in the commission of offence is doubtful, inasmuch as, as per autopsy report, deceased has suffered punctured wound on his head. Lastly, learned counsel would contend that a very vital fact that appellant is under incarceration for last more than five years and do novo trial has been ordered by learned trial Court but the learned trial Court has completely eschewed the same in the impugned order while considering bail plea of the appellant.
(3.) Learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently opposed the appeal and submitted that a discretionary order passed by learned trial Court is not liable to be tinkered with in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.