RATAN SINGH Vs. CHHITAR LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant-plaintiffs have challenged the order dated 29. 7. 99 passed by the Addl. District Judge No. 3, Kota whereby the learned Judge has set aside the judgment and decree dated 27. 10. 86 passed by the learned trial Court and has remanded the case back to the learned trial Court for deciding the issue of partial eviction.

(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that plaintiff Ratan Singh had let out a shop to the respondent Chhitar Lal. However, subsequently Ratan Singh's grand-son Dhirendra Singh wanted to open a shop for soft drinks. THErefore, the plaintiff had a bonafide necessity for wanting the shop to be vacated. Since Chhitar Lal was an agriculturist, who was not using the shop for any personal or business purposes, therefore, he hardly needed the shop. THE plaintiff also contended that the respondent had damaged the premises. According to him the premises were being used for manufacturing `gajak & Revadis'. For this purpose sugarcane and ice is used. He further alleged that the respondent created nuisense by placing chairs, "thela", "bhatti". Whenever the plaintiff would request the respondent to remove such obstacles, the respondent would abuse him in front of the people. THE plaintiff further claimed that he had sent a notice to the respondent on 26. 5. 83 for vacating the shop. In January, 1984, the respondent had promised to vacate the shop within 4-5 months. However, he failed to keep his promise. Thus, the plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide necessity, damage to the premises and nuisense. THE respondent filed his written statement. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial Court framed five issues. In order to prove his case, the plaintiff examined three witnesses. In order to substantiate his case, the defendant examined himself as a witness. After hearing both the parties and after going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide order dated 27. 10. 86, the learned trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and directed the respondent to vacate the shop within a period of two months. Since the respondent was aggrieved by the said order, he filed an appeal before the Addl. District Judge No. 3, Kota. Vide order dated 29. 7. 99, the learned Judge set aside the order dated 27. 10. 86 and directed the learned Judge to examine the issue whether partial eviction would give sufficient space for the landlord to establish his business without causing any nuisense to the tenant or not. Hence this appeal before this court.

(3.) IN the case of Niranjan Lal vs. U. I. T. Alwar & Ors. (SBCMA No. 1253/1998 decided on 21. 8. 2006) = (2007 (1) RLW 350) this Court had an occasion to elaborately discuss the power under Section 107 and Order 41 Rule 23 to 29 of the Code. This Court observed as under:- The purpose behind the Rules is not to initiate de novo trial. The purpose is also not to prolong the dispute between the parties. Since the Judiciary must endeavour to decide the dispute as soon as possible, the appellate court is expected to decide the case at the appellate stage itself. Therefore, the tendency to remand the case in toto after setting aside the judgment of the trial court and the tendency to direct a denovo trial is against the tenor of law. The appellate court is expected to exercise its power within the confines to Rules 23 to 26-A of the Code. Ample powers have been given to the appellate court under Rules, 27, 28 and 29 of the Code to take additional evidence and to decide the issues reframed by it. Since the Trial Court are the most overburdened Courts in the judicial hierarchy, the appellate court should refrain from remanding the case in toto in a routine manner. What can be done at the appellate stage, need not be remanded back to the trail Courts. After all, the buck has to stop somewhere. The poor litigant cannot be treated as a shuttlecock and forced to run from pillar to post, from court to court. The litigant expects the judiciary to decide its case at the earliest. The litigant neither has the financial means, nor the energy to go on a roller-coaster ride of litigations. The judiciary has to be sensitive to the financial condition and to the expectation of the litigant. To prolong a dispute endlessly is not only a disservice to the litigant, but it is an injustice to him. Therefore, this trend of remanding the case back to the trial Court in a mechanical and routine manner has to stop. The learned District Judges, who are experienced and knowledgeable, are expected to do their duty by the litigant.