BHANWAR LAL JAT Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition and the connected writ petitions shown in the Schedule appended to this order involving common questions of law and facts have been heard together and are taken up for disposal by this common order.

(2.) IN sum and substance, all these petitions relate to the question of operation and applicability of rule 7 A (iii) of the Rajasthan Employment of the Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2000 ('the Rules of 2000') for the purpose of selections to the post of Teacher Gr. lll under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 ('the Rules of 1996' ).

(3.) PER contra, it has been emphasized on behalf of the respondents that rule 7a (iii) as a whole applies only to temporary appointments and has got nothing to do with permanent appointments to which the present selections are concerned with. Learned counsel for the respondents would urge that even if rule 7a (iii) has been framed apparently in two different parts, the same is intended to deal only with one single situation that is, regarding a temporary appointment; and the provision contained in the 'second part' is nothing but in the nature of an exception or proviso to the 'first part' to the extent that even in case of temporary appointment, irrespective of the provision contained in the first part that the requirement of training might be relaxed, if such training be an 'essential one', it shall have to be undergone and completed within two years. Learned counsel submit that this interpretation alone remains that of true meaning and import of rule 7a (iii) and not of reading it in two separate clauses as suggested by the petitioners. Learned counsel stressed on the submissions that if the so-called second part was intended to deal with any appointment in contradistinction to temporary appointment, the words would have been definitely deployed conveying and signifying such meaning; and absence of any such expression like permanent appointment in the so-called second part effectively takes away the argument that such second part is a separate provision in itself.