RAJASTHAN KHADI SANGH CHOMU Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RAJASTHAN Khadi Sangh, Chomu has preferred this appeal dissatisfied with the order dated 22. 11. 1996 passed by the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court, Jaipur dated 18. 10. 1994.

(2.) THE brief necessary facts for decision in this appeal are thus: (a) That an industrial dispute under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the effect inter alia whether 14 temporary workers who have not been made permanent are entitled to medical and house rent allowances like the permanent employees; not less than Rs. 20/- towards medical allowance and the house rent allowance @ 20% of the wages. (b) That the Industrial Tribunal adjudicated the aforesaid industrial dispute vide award dated 8. 6. 1983 holding therein that 14 employees mentioned in the list were entitled to medical allowance as is being paid to the regular employees. THE said award dated 8. 6. 1983 attained finality. (c) That on 21. 2. 1984, an application was made under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act on behalf of 14 employees for direction to the present appellant to pay the due amount towards medical allowance and the house rent allowance in addition to other claims. (d) THE claim of 14 employees for medical allowance and the house rent allowance related to different period from the year 1975 until October, 1983. (e) That in response to the application under Section 33c (2), the present appellant-employer inter-alia raised the objection that the award dated 8. 6. 1983 becomes enforceable on expiry of one month from the date of its publication in the official gazette and that until September, 1983, the said award has not been published and, therefore, the application under Section 33 (C) (2) was liable to be dismissed. (f) That the parties led evidence before the Labour Court in support of their rival case. (g) That the Labour Court disposed of the application under Section 33c (2) vide its order dated 18. 10. 1994 over-ruling the objection that the award has not become enforceable. THE Labour Court on the other hand held that the benefits to which the employees are entitled are from the date it became due and not after the award had become enforceable. (h) That the Single Judge was not convinced with the submission of the employer. He held that the award dated 8. 6. 1983 has bestowed upon the 14 workers, the right to get medical allowance and the house-rent allowance and in this view of the matter, the consideration of the application by the Labour Court did not suffer from any illegality.

(3.) IN the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. , New Delhi vs. Their Workmen- 1963 (6) FLR 313, on examination of Section 17a of the INdustrial Disputes act, the Supreme Court held thus: There remains for consideration the question of retrospective operation of the award. Under Section 17-A of the INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947, an award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein but where no date is so specified it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable. Even without a specific reference being made on this question it is open to an industrial tribunal to fix in its discretion a date, a date from which it shall come into operation. The reference, in the present case, included as a matter in dispute the question of retrospective effect in these words:- &nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp" Whether all the above demands should be made applicable retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1956 and what directions are necessary in this respect?" The Tribunal rejected the workmen's claim for giving effect to its award from April, 1956. Wherever however the Tribunal has given relief the Tribunal has directed that the award should come into effect from the date of reference, i. e. January 23, 1958. On behalf of the Company Mr. Pathak contends that there is no reason why the award should be given effect to from any date prior to the date of its pronouncement. We are not impressed by this argument. No general formula can be laid down as to the date from which a Tribunal should make its award effective. That question has to be decided by the Tribunal on a consideration of circumstances of each case. There have been cases where this Court has made an award effective from the date when the demand was first made. There are other cases where the orders of the Tribunal directing the award to the made effective from the date of the award has not been interfered with. It is true that in some cases this Court has modified the Tribunal's award in such a case. But it does not appear however that any general principles have been laid down. INdeed, it is difficult and not even desirable that this Court should try to lay down general principles on such matters that require careful consideration of the peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise of discretion.