STATE Vs. BABULAL PRESIDENT OF BAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHRI Bahadur Singh Chandrawat was District and Sessions Judge at Pratapgarh. The members of the Bar Association and specially its President Sri Babulal made a complaint before the Chief Justice of the High Court alleging misbehavior by the District and Sessions Judge in relation to the day to day conduct of cases. This led admittedly to an enquiry by the Registrar of Vigilance before whom several affidavits were filed by the members of the Bar Association including the President. Besides denying the allegations made against him, Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has very categorically stated that the complaint in question is virtually not the complaint by the Bar Association, Pratapgarh but the same has been engineered by the complainant by misusing the name of Bar Association, since the President of the Bar Association was involved in the matter. In support of his contention, Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has sent photostat copies of affidavits of as many as 15 advocates practicing in the Bar testifying to the effect that they had no complaint or grievance whatsoever against Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat and no such complaint was brought to their notice by the Bar Association, Pratapgarh. Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has also made out a case for contempt against the complainant and prayed for his comments to be treated as a reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

(2.) WE have for our consideration whether the complaint lodged against Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat by the President and Members of the Bar alleging his misbehaviour in the Court in some of the matters placed before him, amounted at all to contempt of court.

(3.) UNDER Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the Presiding Officer of any subordinate court to the High Court to which it is subordinate. The main thing to appreciate in this matter is whether the statement made by the President of the Bar Association and certain members was so done in 'good faith' to the Chief Justice of this Court. According to the General Clauses Act, Section 3(22) 'the thing shall be deemed to be done in 'good faith' where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.' Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code states that 'nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention.' The element of honesty which is there within the purview of Section 3(22), is however not there in Section 52 of Indian Penal Code, because under the latter, the proper point to be decided is not whether the allegations put forward by the person complained against in support of defamation are in substance true, but whether he had good reason after due care and attention. It may well be contended that good faith does not require logical infallibility but merely due care and attention. But as regards erroneous actions or statements which were to be imputed to want of due care and caution, one has to consider with reference to general circumstances and the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question. It is only to be expected that honest conclusions of a calm and philosophical mind may differ from the honest conclusions of an over -zealous person, who is not properly trained to habits of precise reasoning. Bonafide complaints against judicial officers addressed to authorities to seek redress for some grievances and not intended to exert pressure upon such judicial officers in the exercise of judicial functions or to diminish their authority as Judges or vilifying them cannot be treated as contempt. In State v. Harihar Sukhla 1976 Cr.L.J. 507 when the learned Advocate made certain complaints against a particular Magistrate regarding involvement in politics, misbehaving, creating groupism, discrimination and prayed for inquiry and transfer by sending telegram to the Administrative Judge of the Allahabad High Court and ultimately learned Judicial Magistrate after securing a copy of the telegram made a complaint for bringing the learned Advocate within the ambit of contempt of court, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court observed that since the learned Advocate merely made a complaint to the Administrative Judge and he did not take any steps to communicate the contents of the telegram in question to the learned Magistrate and it was the Magistrate who fished out its contents, if would be said that the action of the learned Advocate in sending the telegram had no tendency to intimidate the Magistrate into dealing with the case in a particular manner or to interfere with him fair decision of any case. There was nothing on record to show that learned Advocate did anything to publish the telegram in a manner that its contents became generally known to the public and the dignity of the court be lowered in their eyes.