WG COM H K LAL Vs. SATISH CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the impugned order dated 8th May, 1996 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 165/86. A very interesting question has arisen in this case for consideration of this Court relating to the amendment which has been allowed by the learned trial Court in respect of a previously instituted suit on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide and reasonable personal necessity of the previous landlords/owners of the property in dispute who have been arrayed as respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this revision petition. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the subsequent purchasers for consideration of the said property from plaintiff-respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner-defendant was admittedly a tenant in the residential premises which was previously owned by the plaintiff-respondents No. 1 2. Earlier dispute had arisen between the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, and two grounds regarding default in payment of rent and bona fide personal necessity of the previous owners. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had paid the arrears of rent to the landlords (No. P. No. 1 and 2), hence the question of default did not survive in their favour. The petitioner has been residing in the suit premises as a tenant of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the last 13 years and the property was subsequently sold by respondents No. 1 and 2 to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 under Order 21, Rule 10 read with Order 6 Rule 17, CPC seeking amendment of the plaint on the ground that they are the bona fide purchasers of the said property for consideration by a registered sale-deed dated 16.6.1993. It was alleged in the said application by the applicants that from 16.6.1993 to 28.2.1994, the defendant had committed second default in payment of rent and, therefore, he was entitled to be evicted from the suit premises. Apart from the question of default, the plaintiffs had also alleged that they will file a separate suit for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide necessity. This fact is clearly borne out from para 5 of the said application moved before the trial court on 5.3.1994 wherein there is a specific averment to the said effect. Notwithstanding this plea it is very surprising to note as to how the trial court allowed the amendment of the plaintiffs by passing an order which is admittedly in excess of its jurisdiction and contrary to the pleadings of the parties. The trial Court has apparently lost sight off of a fact that in para 5 of the said application, as referred to above, there is clear admission of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, regarding sale of the property in question in their favour by non-petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and how could the trial court allow the amendment in the plaint particularly when the right of bona fide requirement cannot be passed on to a subsequent purchaser by inheritance or succession. There is no provision in law which permits such kind of a situation. In fact the proper course for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was to have filed a separate suit if at all the ground of personal bona fide necessity was available to them, which option, admittedly, has not been exercised by the said parties. I am of the considered opinion that whenever new plaintiffs are added to the plaint, not only the cause of action changes but also the ground of bona fide-necessity of the previous owners, who had sold the property to the subsequent purchasers, is also washed of and, therefore, the original suit cannot be substituted by the second suit on the same ground.

(2.) AT this stage, an argument has been advanced by Mr. Ranjan, learned counsel for the respondents and a plea that by virtue of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act the subsequent purchaser got the right to advance the plea of bona fide requirement against the existing tenant in the suit property. This argument is wholly untenable since under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act') there is a specific provision under Section 13(1)(h) regarding the bona fide and personal necessity of the owner/landlord which stipulates that a suit for eviction can be filed by the landlord on the ground of bona fide necessity against the tenant and in my consideration opinion the bona fide necessity should be objectively considered and analysed by the Court in each and every case. I am further of the opinion that if at all the ground of bona fide necessity was available, it was open to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to have filed a fresh suit on the said ground and which admittedly stood completely washed off, after the sale of the property to the subsequent purchasers viz., respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

(3.) IN my considered opinion the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the instant case. I am of the view that the trial Court should have dismissed the application for impleadment of the subsequent purchasers of the property in question as necessary parties instead of allowing the amendment on the ground of their personal and bona fide requirement which was not created automatically soon after their purchase of property from the previous owners and the same had to be objectively considered by the trial Court as against the existing tenant i.e. the petitioner herein. It is accordingly directed that the suit for eviction pending before the trial Court will stand dismissed in so far as the ground of bona fide and personal requirement is concerned but the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the subsequent purchasers from instituting a fresh suit against the petitioner on the ground of their personal and bona fide requirement on a fresh cause of action.