BHAGIRATHMAL Vs. GUJARMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was amended in the year 1975 and Section 13-A of the Act, as introduced by the Amendment Act of 1965, came to be amended by an Ordinance issued on 29th September, 1975 which was replaced by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act, 1976. This Section has to be considered in this revision.

(2.) THE facts of the case may be looked into for the purpose of deciding the present matter. A suit for eviction was instituted by the non-petitioners against the petitioner much before 1975 on the ground that the petitioner had made defaults in payment of rent and also on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff. THE rent of the premises was said to be Rs. 50/- p. m. THE suit proceeded and by its order dated 18th May, 1971 the trial Court struck out the defence of the petitioner. THEreafter, the suit came to be decided on 6th October, 1975 and the trial Court held that the rent of the premises was Rs 20/- p. m. and that the land lord had failed to prove his necessity for the suit premises. However, a decree for eviction was passed on the ground that the defence of the tenant had already been struck out. Against this decree, the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge on 28th October, 1975. He also submitted an application in which he did not mention the provision of law under which he was moving the application but he stated that Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 had been amended by Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 and that in accordance with it the rent of the disputed premises, at Rs. 20/- per month may be determined alongwith interest so that he may deposit the same. THE plaintiff landlord also filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 6th October, 1975 as he was aggrieved by the rate at which the rent was decreed. THE appellate Court on the appeal of the land lord remanded the case to the trial court for deciding the question of comparative hardship of the parties in accordance with the amended Section 14 of the Act. THE petitioner's appeal came to be heard on 19th April, 1982 and the appellate Court observed that the judgment and decree of the trial Court had already been set aside in the appeal of the landlord and the appeal of the petitioner had become infructuous and at the same time he sent the application of the petitioner dated. 28th October, 1975 to the trial Court for deciding the same in accordance with law. In this manner, the application came before the trial Court namely, Additional Munsif, Alwar who by his order dated 6th December, 1982 rejected the application. An appeal filed by the petitioner before the Additional District Judge No. 1, Alwar was also dismissed by his order dated 3rd March, 1986. This order has been challenged in the present revision.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that the amended Section 13-A as introduced in the year 1975 was applicable to all pending proceedings in which the suit was for eviction of a tenant on the ground of nonpayment of rent. Under Section 13-A, the tenant has to make an application within 30 days from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance (which is 29-9-1979) upon which the court has to determine the rent payable alongwith interest and cost. According to him, the application moved on 28-10-1975 was under Section 13-A of the Act and the prayer was also in accordance with these provisions and merely because Section 13 (4), (6), (7) have been mentioned in the body of this application, it would have become an application which had already been made and decided under the law. In the application it has been mentioned that because of the amendment in law this application is being moved and the intention is clear that the application was under Sec. 13-A. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on Sanwarmal Vs. Murarilal (1) in which it has been held that the intention of the legislature while enacting amended section 13-A of the Act is that an application has to be moved within 30 days of commencement of the Amending Ordinance. Thus Section 13-A of the Act cannot be read so as to include in it an application made before the coming into force of the Amending Ordinance. In this case, the facts were that on the first date of hearing, the tenant moved an application that he was prepared to deposit the rent due alongwith interest and costs of the suit. The Court permitted the tenant to deposit the rent. In 1972, when the appeal was pending before the lower appellate Court the land lord moved that the defence of the tenant against eviction be struck out and to this application the tenant replied on 1-9-1972 that he had deposited the arrears of rent alongwith interest and was, thereafter depositing rent every month and that he was always ready and willing to deposit the rent. Subsequently, when Section 13-A came to be amended in 1975 the tenant did not move an application within 30 days of the coming into force of the Amending Ordinance but took plea that his reply dated 1st October, 1972 submitted to the application of the landlord seeking to strikeout his defence should be taken as an application under Section 13-A of the Act, but this contention was repelled. It was held that under Section 13-A, the defendant has to move a fresh application within 30 days, as is provided in this provision, and if he fails to do so, then it cannot fall back upon any earlier application made by him before the Amending Ordinance came into force. This answer was given in a reference by a Single Judge to a larger Bench. This, under Section 13-A of the Act, the defendant has to move a fresh application within 30 days of 29th September, 1975 and cannot fall back upon any application moved earlier.