LAWS(RAJ)-1986-7-9

LODHA FABRICS Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Decided On July 04, 1986
LODHA FABRICS Appellant
V/S
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN all these writ petitions common question of fact and law are involved, therefore they are disposed of by a common order. IN all these writ petitions, the petitioners are doing the business of dyeing and printing of cloth at Pali. For the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1872 of 1985 (Lodha Fabrics, Pali v. State of Rajasthan) are taken into consideration.

(2.) ALL these writ petitions have been directed against the assessment orders by the Commercial Taxes Officer. At the outset the question is that whether such writ petitions should be entertained or not. Mr. K. C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the Revenue, has brought to my notice that it is settled proposition of law which has been laid by their Lordships of the Supreme Court repeatedly that under the taxing statutes when complete machinery has been created then extraordinary jurisdiction should only be involved in extraordinary circumstances. In normal course the petitioners should have filed an appeal against the order of assessment and the demand raised against the petitioners before the appellate authority and if they are still aggrieved by that order then there is remedy before the Sales Tax Tribunal, which has been recently created. Thus, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that these writ petitions should be dismissed on a short and sure ground. In support of this proposition the learned counsel for the respondents cited before me the cases of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 and Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330. It has been observed in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 as under : "It is now well-recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of." Similarly their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330 observed as under : "3. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603, A. P. Sen, E. S. Venkataramiah and R. B. Misra, JJ., held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That is has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to article 226 of the Constitution. But then the court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged."

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Air India v. Nergesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829. This case only lays down the parameters of article 14 and a general basis for classification. In this case it has been laid down that there should not be any discrimination amongst the persons similarly situated and it has been further observed that unreasonableness or arbitrariness or inaction can also be struck down. In this case a writ petition was filed by the employee of the Air India that the air crew were not treated at par with the other employees similarly situated and they are discriminated. In this background their Lordships have laid down various parameters of article 14 and also held that arbitrary and unreasonable actions can be declared null and void. But in the present writ petitions I do not find any arbitrariness or unreasonableness with the present definition of "raw material". Thus, this submission of the learned counsel has no merit and is rejected.