RANICHARAN DAS Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS case involves an important question as to whether the transfer of a Government servant to a similar post in the similar cadre is a service matter within the meaning of section 2 (f) (v) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (Act No. 34 of 1976) (for Short, the Act,) and as such the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded under section 10 of the Act?

(2.) THE petitioner Ramcharan Das was appointed as Head Master, Government Secondary School, Ramjipur Kalan (Jaipur) in December 1984, which is said to be at a distance of 30 miles from Jaipur. He made a request to the Chief Minister for his transfer to Jaipur city on the ground that he is a chronic patient of dysentery and needs constant medical help at times. THE petitioner has got a widowed sister whose entire family of 10 members is dependent on him. His sister lives in Dinanathji ki gali at Jaipur. He was twice operated upon for 'harnia' and a similar request was made to the Education Minister and Director, Primary and Secondary Education. His request was ultimately accepted and under order dated July 15, 1986 he was transferred from Government Higher Secondary School Ramjipura Kalan to Government Higher Secondary School, Residency, Jaipur vice the non-petitioner No. 3 Manak Chand Agrawal, who was Head Master at the Residency School for last about 2-1/2 years. He assumed charge on July 19,1986 because the respondent No. 3 was not available and information was sent to the various authorities including a telegram on July 19, 1986 to the Director Primary and Secondary Education Government of Rajasthan Bikaner. THE respondent No. 3 was also sent information to send the key of the double lock and record relating to cash but the respondent No. 3 avoided giving of the key. He (petitioner) however started effectively functioning as Head Master of the Residency School since July 19,1986 and the salary for the month of July 1986 was also drawn by him.

(3.) UNDER section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code the courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The law is settled that exclusion of the jurisdiction of a court cannot be readily inferred and there is presumption against exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction. In Dhulabhai etc. V. State of Madhya Pradesh (4) after considering the law on the point in para No. 32 the Supreme Court laid down seven principles regarding the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court The principle No. 7 laid down by their Lordships is that an exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions set down in principles Nos. 1 to 6 apply. In Musamai Imam Haider Bax Razvi V. Babri Govindbhai Ratanbhai (5) in para No. 7 their Lordships observed that it is necessary to bear in mind the important principle of construction which is that if statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of a civil court it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. As the Judicial Committee observed in Secretary of State V. Mask and Co. 67 Ind. Appeal 222 at page 236 = AIR 1940 PC 105 at 1 10. Again in case of Dewaji V. Ganpatlal (6) in para No. 12 it has been held that if the Legislature intends to oust the jurisdiction of civil courts, it must say so expressly or by necessary implication. A reference is made to State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (7 ). Section 64-C of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, came up for consideration in the context of the civil court jurisdiction. The said section provided that any order passed by the Government or other authority under the aforesaid Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of the said Act shall subject only to any appeal or revision provided by or under the Act be final. Sub-section (2) of that section-provided that no such order shall be liable to be questioned in any court of law. Dhulabhai's case (supra) was considered in detail in the foresaid case and it was held that several other aspects like the scheme of the Act adequacy and sufficiency of remedies provided by it etc. will have to be considered to ascertain the precise intendment of the Legislature. It was held that the Settlement Officer has no power to do what civil court would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of civil court's jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer's order under Section 64-C of the Act.