SUNIL KUMAR ALAIS GUDDU Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhilwara dated March 19, 1980 convicting the appellant Sunil Kumar under sections 394 and 353, I. P. C. and sentencing him to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default of the payment of fine to further undergo four months' like imprisonment on the first count and two months' rigorous imprisonment on the second count.

(2.) THE case relates to an accident alleged to have taken place at about 8. 30 p. m. on August 16, 1978, in which the passenger bus No. R. R. M. 8874 was looted on a public highway. THE said bus was proceeding from Bundi to Bijoli When it stopped near mile stone 20, two passengers got down and three persons boarded the bus. When the bus proceeded further, Balkarsingh asked the condcu-tor to take the bus in a lonely side. He also fired the gun towards the conductor. THE driver, therefore, took the bus in a lonely side. Balkarsingh and his two companions thereafter relieved the passengers of their valuables like orna, ments, cash, wrist watches etc. THE report EX. P 2 of this incident was lodged at about 9. 30 p. m. on the same day at Police Station, Bijoli by Maanu Lal the driver of the bus. THE police registered a case and proceeded with investigation. In all, four persons were arrested including the appellant Sunil Kumar. THE appellant was arrested on September 19, 1978 vide arrest memo EX. P 35. In consequence of the information furnished by him, one wrist watch, one torch, one umbrella and one towl were recovered. In consequence of the second information furnished by him, one more wrist watch (Art. 3) was recovered from his house. After investigation, the police submitted a challan against the four accused including the appellant Charges were framed against them, to which they pleaded not guilty and faced the trial. THE prosecution examined a number of witnesses and filed some documents. In defence, no evidence was adduced. On the conclusion of the trial, Balkarsingh and Sunil Kumar (appellant) were convicted under section 394, IPC while accused Sudhir Kumar was convicted under section 411, I. P. C. THE fourth accused Satya Narain was acquitted. Aggrieved against his conviction and sentence, accused Sunil Kumar has come-up in appeal.

(3.) THE only piece of evidence which speaks against the appellant is that the wrist watch (Article 2) was recovered from his possession on September 22, 1978 in consequence of the information furnished by him on the same day. THE robbery was committed on August 16, 1978 and the appellant was arrested on Sept. 19, 1978 that is, after one month of the commission of the offence. THE ' recovery of wrist watch (Article 2) in consequence of the information furnished by the appellant from his possession has not been challenged by Mr. Mathur. It has also not been challenged that it is a stolen property. THE question which arises for consideration is whether the accused can be connected with the commission of the robbery only on account of this recovery of the wrist watch at his instance. Now, what type of presumption should be raised under Illustration 'a' of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, depends upon the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances is the time factor. If the Interval between the commission of the offence and the recovery of the stolen article is of short period, the presumption can be raised that the person in whose possession the stolen property has been found is the thief. But when the interval is a longer one, the safer course is to draw a presumption that he is the receiver of the stolen property. Here in the instant case, the interval between the commission of the offence and the recovery of the stolen wrist watch is of one month. In these circumstances, it would, not be legitimate and a proper exercise of the discretion to raise a presumption against the appellant that he was the person who had looted the passengers in the bus. THE safer course would be to raise a presumption that the appellant was a receiver of the stolen property.