CHOTE LAL Vs. KALYAN PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ORDER :- The question which arises for determination in this revision is about the jurisdiction of the trial Court after the matter has been remanded to it by the appellate Court. In this case, a suit for partition of property was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Bharatpur, who decreed the suit on 27-9-1976. In an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Deeg (Bharatpur), a certified copy of one document was admitted in evidence under O.41, R.27, C.P.C. The appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgement of the learned Civil Judge and issued a direction at the time of the remand that the plaintiff and defendant shall be given an opportunity to prove or disprove the document and thereafter the decision should be given. After the matter went back to the learned Civil Judge, the non-petitioners moved an application under O.13, R.2, C.P.C. for the production of a document and this was admitted by the impugned order by the learned Civil Judge and the same has been challenged in this revision.

(2.) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdiction of the Court after remand is limited to the directions made by the appellate Court and it is not open to the trial Court to allow the production of fresh documents or consider other matters in contravention of the order of remand.

(3.) As against this, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners has contended that while passing the order of remand, the learned Additional District Judge has set aside the decree of the trial Court which means that it was an open remand and in such circumstances, the trial Court can try the suit and dispose it in accordance with the provisions of law without being circumscribed in any manner. According to the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, the appellate Court in this case has not placed any limit on the powers of the trial Court and as such it was permissible for the trial Court to admit document under O.13, R.2, C.P.C. It is also contended that this Court should not interfere in revision because it cannot be said that the trial Court has acted with material irregularity and the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the petitioner.