ROBERT J HENDERSON Vs. TIMOTHY G MORGAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) "The Court: I inferred that he struck her, not cut her, didn't use the knife?

(2.) This case is unusual in that the offence to which the defendant pleaded was not charged in the indictment. The indictment charged first-degree murder. The defendant pleaded guilty to the included offence of second-degree murder, the elements of which were not set forth in any document which had been read to the defendant or to which he had access. See McCarthy V/s. United States. 394 US 459, 467 n 20 = (22 L Ed 2d 418 = 89 S Ct 1166). In those cases in which the indictment is read to the defendant by the court at arraignment or at the time of his plea, his plea of guilty may well be deemed a factual admission that he did what he is charged with doing such that a judgment of conviction may validly be entered against him.

(3.) In Brady V/s. United States, 397 US 742, 755 = (25 L Ed 2d 747 = 90 S Ct 1463) (1970), the Court, in dealing with a pre-McCarthy guilty plea held that the "standard of voluntariness for guilty pleas" is that "a plea of guilty, entered by one fully aware of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor or his own counsel must stand unless induced by treats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment}, misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes)" (citations omitted). But the Court refers to "voluntary in a constitutional sense" stating that the term includes the requirement of "real notice of the true nature of the charge" (ante, p -, 49 L Ed 2d 114) citing the pre-Boykin case of Smith V/s. O Grady,1941 312 US 329 Smith involved an "uneducated" defendant "without counsel, bewildered by court processes strange and unfamiliar to him and inveigled by false statements of state law enforcement officers into entering a plea of guilty." 312 US at 334 = (85 L Ed 859 = 61 S Ct 572). The Court further observed that Smith's plea was involuntary because he had not received any "real notice of the true nature of the true charge against him," ibid. That is, he was told he was pleading to "simple burglary" and would receive a 3-year sentence when in fact he was tricked into pleading to "burglary with explosives" and was sentenced to 20 years. Thus the "notice" required by Smith is accurate information as to the offence and sentence which one is pleading, which respondent received.