(1.) Heard learned counsel. In this writ petition three contentions were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the first place, it was urged that the petitioner was an existing operator of Banswara -Bheelkunwa -Dohad route and he applied for renewal of his permit on the aforesaid route, but the renewal was refused on the ground that the portion from Banswara to Bheelkunwa had by then become part of the notified route from Udaipur to Kushalgarh. The grievance of the learned counsel is not that the permit was not renewed for the entire route, because for the portion from Banswara to Bheelkunwa the permit of the petitioner could not admittedly be renewed on account of the provisions of Sec. 68 -FF of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But the grievance of the learned counsel is that the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur should have renewed the permit of the petitioner for the remaining portion of the aforesaid route, from Bheelkunwa to Dohad, which did not form part of the notified route. I have perused the order of the Regional Transport Authority and that of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan. No submission to the above effect was made by the petitioner before either of the two Authorities. Time was also allowed to the petitioner to produce a copy of his memo of appeal to show if this objection had been raised by him by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. But the copy of the memo of appeal has not been produced and it can be presumed that the petitioner did not urge in his appeal before the Tribunal that his permit should be renewed for the portion from Bheelkunwa to Dohad. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called 'the Tribunal') enjoyed the same powers while deciding the appeal of the petitioner, as were enjoyed by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, in respect of the renewal of permits and if the petitioner would have urged before the Tribunal that his permit should be renewed for the remaining portion from Bheelkunwa to Dohad there could have been no objection. But as no such plea was raised before the Tribunal, it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in a writ petition before this Court.
(2.) The second contention of the learned counsel is that inspite of the fact that Banswara to Bheelkunwa portion of the route from part of the notified route from Udaipur to Kushal Garh, yet the Regional Transport Authority granted a non -temporary permit under Chapter IV to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called 'the Corporation') for the entire route from Banswara to Dohad via Bheelkunwa. I am not impressed with this submission. The nationalisation scheme only prohibits the plying of vehicles by private operators over the notified route or portions thereof and there is no prohibition from granting permits to the Corporation on portions of the notified route along with other routes or their portions, which do not form of the notified route. A similar question was raised in Shankerlal vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 1246 of 1973, decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on October 17, 1973). It was held in that case that the scheme provides indulgence to the Corporation to ply its stage carriages on portions of the notified route and no valid exception could be taken to the grant of permits to the Corporation in respect of routes which partly overlap portions of the notified route. I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in Shankerlal's case (supra) and the contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, repelled.
(3.) The third submission made by the learned counsel is that the grant of a permit was made in favour of the Corporation by the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur by its order dated May 3, 1976 on the condition that the Corporation shall employ a vehicle of the prescribed model within a period of 60 days and in case the permit was not obtained within the aforesaid period then the sanction of the permit in favour of the Corporation shall automatically come to the an end. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Corporation has not complied with this condition. If there is any non -compliance with the condition laid down by the Regional Transport Authority in its order dated May 3, 1976, then the matter should be raised by the petitioner before the said authority and unless and until the matter is raised before and decided by the Regional Transport Authority, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise it before this court. With these observations the writ petition is dismissed summarily.