SUMER SINGH Vs. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There was a bus route from Borawar to Pushkar (hereinafter referred to as 'the route') about 90 Kilometers in length, which lay partly in Jodhpur region and partly in the Jaipur region of the State of Rajasthan. The operators of the route appear to have submitted an application for the extension of the route from Pushkar to Ajmer, but the State Transport Authority, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the S. T. A.') rejected the aforesaid application by its resolution dated February 5, 1973 and did not grant the desired extension. The petitioner No. 1 is the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Baser in Nagaur district, while the petitioner No. 2 is the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Kadel in Ajmer district. The two petitioners, acting on behalf of the inhabitants of the area and the Panchayats of which they were Sarpanchas some time later submitted representation to the S. T. A. that the route in question should be extended upto Ajmer so as to make available the inhabitants of the area a direct bus service for reaching Ajmer and thereby avoid unnecessary change of buses at Pushkar. The S. T. A. then got a survey conducted in the matter and the survey report favoured the grant of an extension in the interest of the travelling public. The S. T. A. thereupon gave notices to the existing operators of the route under Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to show cause as to why the route of their permits be not varied by inclusion of the portion of the route from Pushkar to Ajmer, which is only about 10 kilometers in length. Bachhraj Singh, respondent No. 3, who is an existing operator of Makrana-Ajmer route though a different via, objected to the grant of extension of the route upto Ajmer. It may be mentioned here that Makrana- Ajmer route over-laps the route from Makrtna to Bhadasia and thereafter it takes a turn and passes over a different course via Harsor for reaching Ajmer. The S. T. A. did not agree with the contentions raised on behalf of the objector, Bachhraj Singh and held that the extension of the route upto Ajmer would serve public interest, as it would remove the hardship of the passengers going from different places on the route to Ajmer. Thus, in view of the persistent demand of the inhabitants of the area, the route was extended upto Ajmer by the resolution of the S. T. A. dated August 30, 1973. Bachhraj Singh filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter briefly referred to as 'the S. T. A. T.) against the aforesaid resolution of the S. T. A. dated August 30, 1973. Initially the petitioners were not made parties to the appeal before the S. T. A. T., but on their application, the S. T. A. T. directed the appellant Bachhraj Singh by its order dated November 14, 1973, to add the petitioners as parties to the appeal, representing the Gram Panchayats Baser and Kadel. The petitioners were accordingly added as parties to the appeal and after hearing all the parties concerned, the S. T. A. T. allowed the appeal by its order dated December 10, 1973, on the sole ground that the extension granted by the S. T. A. under Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act was without jurisdiction, as a variation of the route of a permit by changing one of the terminii thereof could be directed only under Section 57 (8) of the Act and not under Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act. According to the S. T. A. T., under Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act only a diversion of the route between the two terminii fixed for the original route could be permitted and an extension beyond any one of the two terminii was outside the scope of the provisions of Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act.

(2.) The two petitioners have challenged the aforesaid order of the S. T. A. T. dated December 10, 1973, by means of the present writ petition and it is urged by Mr. Chhangani on their behalf that the view regarding the relevant provisions of the Act taken by the S. T. A. T. was apparently erroneous, as there was no such limitation contained in Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act that an extension beyond any one of the two terminii could not be ordered under the said provision.

(3.) Mr. Maheshwari, appearing for the respondent Bachhraj Singh, has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners are Sarpanchas of the village Panchayats and they have no personal interest in the subject-matter of the writ petition and as such a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable on their behalf. Some decisions were cited by the learned counsel in support of his contention that the existence of a legal right is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that ordinarily a petitioner must be able to show a subsisting personal right and its infringement, in order to maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not necessary in the present case to go into the larger question as to whether the existence of a subsisting personal right or interest is necessary for maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not denied that it was at the instance of the two petitioners that the S. T. A. issued notices under Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act to the existing operators of the route for varying the conditions of their permits by inclusion of the Pushkar to Ajmer portion in the route of their permits. It is also on record that the S. T. A. allowed the aforesaid extension in view of the persistent demands of the inhabitants of the village situated on the route and included in the Gram Panchayats represented by the petitioners. It is further on record that on the application of the petitioners, the S. T. A. T. held that the petitioners had sufficient interest in the matter of variation of the route and directed the respondent Bachhraj Singh to make the petitioners parties to the appeal before that Tribunal. The respondent No. 3 complied with this direction and the amended memo of appeal (Annexure P/15) shows that the petitioners were added as respondents Nos. 7 and 8 to the appeal filed by the respondent Bachhraj Singh before the S. T. A. T. Thus the petitioners were parties to the proceedings before the lower authorities, leading to the passing of the order of the S. T. A. T. dated December 10, 1973. There is no doubt that existence of a subsisting legal right in the petitioner is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and such legal right which could be thus enforced, should ordinarily be of the petitioner himself, but in some cases this rule can be relaxed or modified, if exigencies of the case so require. In the peculiar circumstances of the present case, I am inclined to entertain the writ petition filed by the two petitioners, although they have no personal or individual right to enforce.