(1.) The facts are that on 10.7.1950 Puran, plaintiff -respondent, brought a suit for the declaration of khatedari rights, restoration of possession and grant of permanent injunction in respect of certain plots of agricultural land specified in the plaint, which formerly were biswedari land in Alwar District. The plaintiff -respondent did not implead the State, and the trial court held that the State was not a necessary party within the meaning of Sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959. The suit was dismissed on merits after taking the evidence of parties. The plaintiff - respondent went in appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority who held that the State was a necessary party and ordered a retrial.
(2.) The learned Revenue Appellate Authority has apparently laboured under the impression that the State is a necessary party in all cases where the property involved is land which was once held on zamindari or biswedari basis. The correct position in law is that the court itself has to determine whether the State is a necessary party in a particular case. Such a determination must be based on an identification of the interest of the State that is likely to be affected. In the present case, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority has not brought out what interest the State has so as to involve the State as a necessary party for the purposes of Sec. 5 of the aforesaid Act. When the objection was raised in the first appeal that the State should have been impleaded, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority should have issued notice to the State through the Collector and then come to a conclusion whether the State was a necessary party or not.
(3.) In the result, we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, and remand the case with the direction that the first appeal should be heard after notice to the State through the Collector. Eventually, if the Revenue Appellate Authority comes to the conclusion that the State is a necessary party, appropriate orders may be passed; otherwise the first appeal should be disposed of on the merits.