STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. MADHO SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State Government has filed this appeal against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner, dated 26. 12. 1964, disposing of the first Government appeal against the order passed in favour of the respondent, declaring certain lands of his village Mirjawali in Tehsil Hanumangarh, District Ganganagar as his khudkasht lands. Briefly, the facts are that the Additional Collector, Ganganagar declared 392 bighas 1 biswa land in Mirjawali as khudkasht of the respondent, Madhosingh who was a biswedar. THE Government objected to 70 bighas and 6 biswas of land comprising khasra numbers 256, 65, 241, 250 and 260 out of the land so declared. That appeal was rejected. THE Government has again come up in the second appeal and has assailed the decision of the Revenue Appellate Authority on two grounds. First it is averred that the application u/s 6 was filed later than one month after the date of resumption which was 15. 11. 1959 and was thus time barred. Secondly, that the 70 bighas and 6 biswas of land was not khudkasht land as recorded in the settlement record.

(2.) AS regards the first contention the counsel for the respondent replied that the provisions contained in sec. 5 sub-sec. 4 of the Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act are the same as those in sec. 23 of the Land Reform and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952. The Jagir Act did not provide any time for the submission of the list. It is only in the rules that the submission of list is required within one month. Moreover, it has been held in the case of Thakur Bhanupratap Singh vs. The State, as reported in R. R. D. 1964 p. 110 that the Government was not to penalise the Jagirdar for not filing his claim in time. On the contrary, a duty is laid down on the authority to prepare the claim of the Jagirdar departmentally on the failure of the jagirdar to do so. The counsel also drew our attention to the judgment of the Board of Revenue in State vs. Sardar Singh reported in R. R. D. 1964 p. 143, wherein it has been laid down that it is not necessary to file the list of the property under sec. 23 of the Jagir Act. That property which is mentioned in the aforesaid section does not vest in the State but remains with the Jagirdar, if it answers to the description of such property. The counsel therefore urged that taking the two decisions in view, the limitation period of one month for filing the application for declaring khudkasht land cannot be used as a handle to penalise, the biswedar by refusing to allow him to retain the property which does not vest in the State. There is much force in the reply given by the counsel for the respondent. The rule 6 of the Biswedari and Jamindari Abolition Rules framed u/s 5 sub-sec. 4 requiring submission of the list of khudkasht land, within one month is, obviously, meant for administrative purposes and it cannot be used for penalising the biswedar for depriving him of the lands which otherwise would remain with him as a result of the abolition of his estate. We have already taken the view u/s 23 of the Jagir Act that even if the Jagirdar does not file a list of his private property it does not mean that the property of the nature mentioned in sec. 23 of the Jagir Act would vest in the State. The list is only required by the authority concerned in order to settle all disputes, which may arise with regard to the ownership and possession of the khudkasht land at the time of the resumption of biswedari. If no dispute arises and if the land is clearly recorded in the annual register as his khudkasht, the question of filing list of such property should not arise. It is an administrative arrangement by which the list is required to be furnished in order to settle disputes if and when they arise. The provision of sec. 5 sub-sec. 4 in regard to khudkasht land is as follows: - "sec. 5 sub-sec. (4) - Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (2) the Zamindar or Biswedar shall subject to the provisions of sec. 29, continue to retain the possession of his khudkasht, recorded as such in the annual registers before the date of vesting. " Therefore it must he held that the intention of the legislature in incorporating one month's limitation in the rule was to provide administrative convenience to settle disputes if they should arise. If no dispute arises, the limitation of one month in that rule has no meaning. Thus the respondent cannot be penalised for the non-submission of the list of such property in time. In this case, the respondent has submitted a list, although belated. We hold that the limitation period is not fatal in this case. The contention of the Government Advocate is, therefore, over-ruled. The second contention of the Government Advocate was that although 70 bighas and 6 biswas of land which is assailed is entered as 'khud-kabij' in the annual register, it cannot be equated with khudkasht and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to remain with the respondent. The counsel for the respondent's reply was that the term Khudkabij coupled with the entry "majrua" clearly shows that the respondent was in possession of the land in question. This possession of the culturable land by the respondent clearly denotes that the land was his khudkasht although that word may not have been used. We have considered the arguments advanced on both sides. We are unable to accept the interpretation offered by the Government Advocate with regard to the meaning to be attached to the term 'khudkabij'. This term clearly shows that the land was in the possession of the respondent and the land was culturable although it may not have been cultivated. We are clearly of the opinion that the term khudkabij coupled with the entry mazrua equates with the term khudkasht and the meaning of those terms is practically the same. That means the land has been in the cultivatory possession of the biswedar in accordance with the entries made in the annual register. These two terms are, therefore, synonymous and we have no hesitation in holding that the use of the word khudkabij coupled with the entry mazrua in the annual register clearly denotes that the land was kept by the biswedar as his khudkasht land. Although no definition of the "khudkasht" in the Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 is given yet sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) clearly states that the words and expressions defined in Rajasthan Tenancy Act and in the Land Revenue Act, but not defined in this Act, shall be construed to have the same meaning assigned to them, by those Acts. The terms khudkasht has been defined in the Tenancy Act as land cultivated personally and includes the land recorded as khudkasht, sir, hawala or Niji Jot etc. in settlement records. It clearly means that either the estate-holder should have cultivated the land personally or it should have been recorded in any of the terms used in the definition. Those terms in our opinion are purely illustrative and not exhaustive. They clearly show that the land has been recorded and used by the landholder for his self-cultivation and possession. Thus there is not much force in this contention of the Government Advocate also. We accordingly reject the State appeal. .