STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. MAJOR RAGHURAJ SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two civil appeals arise out of a single judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Bundi, dated 14th October, 1958, in a suit for refund of money and we propose to dispose of them together by present judgment.

(2.) THE material facts may shortly be stated as follows : THE plaintiff was the ex-Jagirdar of Thikana Koila in the former State of Kota. It is admitted that his jagir was resumed by the State on the 1st August, 1954, under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. THE State of Kota, as it then was, was merged in what may conveniently be called the first United State of Rajasthan in April, 1948, and became part of the second United State of Rajasthan which was formed in the middle of 1949. THE last mentioned State was then formed into the Part B State of Rajasthan with the coming into force of the Constitution on 26th January, 1950, and is now represented by the present State of Rajasthan as it was constituted under the States Reorganisation Act (Act No. XXXI of 1956), 1956. It is further common ground between the parties that the first United State of Rajasthan issued Ordinances No. 27 of 1948 and Nos. 10 and 15 of 1949, by which the management of all jagirs existing in that State including the jagir of the present appellant was taken over by the then State by virtue of the provisions of those Ordinances. THE position, therefore, was that when the second United State of Rajasthan was formed in May, 1949, these Ordinances were in force in a part of the State and the jagirs in that area were managed by the State, while similar jagirs in other States continued to be managed by the Jagirdars themselves. It was in these circumstances that Rao Manohar Singh filed a writ application in this Court being D. B. Civil Miscellaneous (writ) Case No. 1 of 1951, in which the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Ordinances was impugned. By the judgment dated 11th December, 1951, it was held by a Bench of this Court that sec. 8-A which was introduced in Ordinance No. 27 of 1949 by sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1949 and the amendment to sec. 8-A, by sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 15 of 1949 were unconstitutional and void under Art. 13 (1) of the Constitution read with Art. 14 thereof. In the result the State was prohibited from collecting rents from the tenants of land comprising the Jagir of Bedla. It may also be pointed out here that the State went up in appeal from that judgment to the Supreme Court where also the decision of this Court was upheld (see State of Rajasthan vs. Rao Manohar Singhji (A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court page 297 ). Even so it is admitted between the parties that the defendant State continued to retain the management of the plaintiff's jagir right from 1st April, 1951 upto 1st August, 1954. Out of the income which the State thus realised from the plaintiff's jagir, according to the plaintiff, it retained certain sums by way of collection charges namely, Rs. 10,361/4/- for the year 1951-52, another sum of Rs. 10,995/13/6 for the year 1952-53, and a further sum of Rs. 27,487/6/6 for the year 1953-54, out of the total income of the jagir in respect of the land rent for the aforementioned years upto 1st August, 1954, at the rate of 35 per cent of the entire income of the jagir. THE plaintiff further alleged that the defendant State also made like deductions with respect to the forest income of his jagir being a sum of Rs. 1,073/6/3 for the year 1951-52, Rs. 121/11/6 for the year 1952-53 and Rs. 451/11/- for the year 1953-54 upto 1st August, 1954. THE plaintiff's case thus was that the defendant had wrongfully retained a sum of Rs. 50,491/4/9 by way of collection charges from the income of his jagir. It is alleged the plaintiff asked for the refund of this amount from the defendant many a times, but without any purpose and, therefore, after giving the statutory notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure he brought this suit out of which the present appeals arise. In this suit apart from claiming the amount of Rs. 50,491/4/9 as stated above, he also claimed a sum of Rs. 4,896/12/9 as being his losses on account of the negligence of the defendant State in not realising the due rents during the period mentioned above, and on the total amount thus arrived at, he claimed interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month to the tune of Rs. 17,339/3/3 and in this way filed this suit for the recovery of Rs. 72,727/4/9.

(3.) THIS brings us to the first contention raised by learned counsel for the State to the effect that as the legal representatives of the deceased had been brought within limitation on the record of the other appeal namely, No. 20 of 1959, it was not at all necessary for the State to have taken any further steps for the very purpose so far as State's appeal was concerned. Considerable reliance has been placed before us in support of this submission on the ground that the two appeals had been ordered to be linked up together and further a single paper-book had also been ordered to be made for both the cases. We have carefully considered this contention and have come to the conclusion that it is without substance. It is true, that the two appeals had been ordered by this Court to be linked up together by its order dated 30th January, 1959. THIS was obviously because both the appeals arose out of a single judgment and, conveniently enough, they could be disposed of together. For the same reason a single paper-book was considered sufficient for the two cases, but this was obviously for the purpose of saving unnecessary expense to both the parties inasmuch as if two separate paper-books were allowed to be constructed, then some of the papers were bound to be common to both of them and there would have been a duplication of labour and expenditure which was clearly avoidable. The crucial question is whether on account of the circumstances that we have discussed above, the two appeals ceased to have a separate individuality. Our answer to this question is in the negative. They were separately numbered in the register of this Court and separate proceedings were also drawn up in both the appeals if and as necessity arose. Again, the subject matter of the two appeals was different, and the success or failure of the one would not automatically lead to the success or failure of the other. In these circumstances we are not at all satisfied that the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Raghuraj Singh, who was the plaintiff-appellant in appeal No. 20 of 1959, should be treated as amounting to the substitution of his legal representatives also in appeal No. 19 of 1959, which was brought by the State against him. The only case to which our attention has been invited by learned counsel for the appellant State is Hukam Chand vs. Laxmi Narain (3 ). THIS was a case in which an appeal had been filed by the defendant, while a cross-objection by the plaintiff. One of the respondents in the cross-objection died and his legal representatives were allowed to be brought on the record and the application made in that behalf was within time. No application for bringing his legal representatives on the record of the appeal was, however, made by the appellants. In these circumstances the question arose whether the legal representatives of the deceased who had been brought on the record in the cross-objection should be deemed to be so brought on the record for the purposes of the appeal also. THIS question was answered in the affirmative. The principal reason for this conclusion seems to us to be that the appeal and the cross-objection formed part of one and the same record. They are not numbered separately in the registers of the court and the parties in both the proceedings occupy the same role, that is to say, the appellant in the appeal continues to be shown as appellant in the cross-objection also and the respondent in the appeal files the cross-objection as respondent. That, however, cannot be said in the case of two separate appeals filed by the opposing parties, though they arise out of the same judgment. Therefore, the analogy of this Case is not applicable to the case before us.