STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. L D SILVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are two appeals No. 32 of 1952 filed by the State of Rajasthan and No. 33 of 1952 filed by Hakim Martin D'silva -- which arise out of the judgment of the District Judge, Jaipur City, dated the 28th of February, 1952, in a case of reference under the Land Acquisition Act fixing the compensation for the property alleged to have been acquired at Rs. 48,000/ -.

(2.) THE facts of this case are that Hakim Martin D'silva and others (hereinafter to be referred to as the owners) held certain land and buildings in Moti Katla Bazaar, Jaipur, to the east of Amer Road. THE Government intended to widen the Amer Road and for that purpose thought it proper to acquire the aforesaid properties. At the time proceedings for acquisition of the aforesaid properties were initiated the Jaipur Land Acquisition Regulation of Samvat Year 1987 was in force. THE procedure to be followed under that Regulation required that the department or the Municipal Board when any land was required to be acquired had to make an application to the Durbar for acquisition of the same. It was then under Section 6 of the Regulation for the Durbar to appoint a Land Acquisition Officer in case the application was sanctioned. THE Land Acquisition Officer was then to mark out and measure the land and prepare a plan of it. A public notice then had to be published at a convenient place on or near the land to be acquired that also by publication in the Jaipur Gazette stating the particulars of the land and the intention of the Durbar to take possession of it. By the same notice all persons interested in the land were also to be required to appear personally or otherwise before the Land Acquisition Officer and to state the nature of their respective interests and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation. THE Land Acquisition Officer after holding necessary enquiries had to make an award under Section 11 of the Regulation which was to be notified in the Jaipur Gazette. THE Land Acquisition Officer after the publication of the award in the manner prescribed under Section 11 of the Regulation was then authorised to take possession of the property which was to vest from that time absolutely in the Durbar free from all encumbrances. Any person not accepting the award could make an application to the Land Acquisition Officer requiring him to refer the case for the determination of the Durbar.

(3.) THE reasoning contained in the Bombay (E) and Madras (DJ decisions is that though the Collector acting under the Land Acquisition Act is an agent of the Government, the Government is bound by the acts of its agent only in so far as those acts are in accordance with law and the Government is not bound by the acts of its agent which are contrary to the provisions of law. In one of those cases the Collector did not apply his mind to the point of limitation and made a reference and in the other case the Collector though holding that the application for reference was time barfed made a reference and included this point in the re ference itself for the determination of the Court. It was, therefore, held that the principle of law laid down in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad (A), was not the correct one. Mr. Kasliwal has tried to distinguish the Madras (D) and Bombay (E) decisions by urging that in those cases the Government could disown the acts of the Collector who was its agent on the ground that such acts were contrary to law but in the present case the reference had been made under the direction of the Government itself and the Government, therefore, should not be allowed to disown its own actions. THE logie of this argument is based on the law governing principal and agent. We may point out that when there is a specific provision of law the general law of principal and agent cannot be applied. THE Government cannot be estopped from pleading that certain provisions of law have not been followed merely because at some stage or the other it directed the Collector to make a reference. In our opinion the principles contained in the decisions of the Madras and Bombay High Courts referred to above are sound and deserve to be followed in preference to those laid down in the Bhagwan Prasad's case (A ).