MANGILAL Vs. NARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision against an original order of the A. S. O. Phagi dated 3. 2. 55 in a case relating to grant of Parcha Chakbandi. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record as well. The order of the trial court which forms subject matter of this revision was passed on 3. 2. 55 and this revision application was presented on 12. 1. 56. The order of the trial court could have been challenged in first as well as in second appeal and it is significant to observe that both these remedies were not availed of by the applicants. The reason advanced on behalf of the applicants for belated presentation of this revision is that they came to know of the order of the trial court on 10. 1. 56. The circumstances under which this knowledge came to them have neither been stated in the application nor explained satisfactorily before us. No affidavit has been filed in support of this contention. The only ground made out on behalf of the applicants before us is that the statement of Mangilal, which forms the basis of the order of the lower court, was not actually made by him. It is obvious that this statement of Mangilal dated 28. 1. 55, if correct, would justify the decision of the lower court fully. It has been admitted by the applicants before us that the A. S. O. was present in the village on 28. 1. 55 and that he attended to a number of objections there. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that somebody else impersonated Mangilal before the Assistant Settlement Officer and that Mangi Lal himself did not make a statement before him. In fact Mangilal has not filed any affidavit to this effect before us, inspite of the fact that he was personally required to be present before us. As laid down in Sec. 80 of the Indian Evidence Act, whenever any document is produced before any court purporting to be a record or memorandum of evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any officer authorised by law to take such evidence, it shall be presumed that the document is genuine, that the statement purporting to be made by the person signing it is true and that such evidence was duly taken. On the point as to whether any presumption can be made as regards the identity of the deponent, legal opinion is divided. According to one view when a person denies having made the statement, no presumption arises under this section, of his having made the statement. According to the other view, it would be practically impossible to prove the identity of the deponent and cases can be easily conceived where such evidence might be available. As observed by the learned author in his commentary (Monir's Law of Evidence 3rd Edition) page 609 "the presumption as to the identity of the deponent is, it is submitted, justifiable both by the reason and language of Sec. 80 as well as by Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act and this view is supported by authority. The Privy Council has held that the court may under See. 114 presume the identity of a person who appears before a sub-registrar on the mere production of a registered document having an endorsement that person appeared before him and admitted execution of the document. In law there is a strong presumption against fraud and impersonation and it is submitted, the identity of the deponent may be presumed on the principle of the Privy Council decision last cited. " In the present case, Mangilal has not dared to file an affidavit before us that infact his statement was not recorded by the Assistant Settlement Officer. For these reasons we are of the opinion that this revision besides being unduly belated is devoid of all substance as well. It is hereby rejected. .