NAVIN R KAMANI Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel , for Respondents that the writ petition has been filed on 16th April 1994 and, therefore, it suffers from laches. Besides this, it has also been submitted that the petitioners have no locus standing in as much as in the revenue record the land does not stand in the name of the petitioners and that there is mis- statement of fact in the writ petition.

(2.) THE contention of the learned counsel , for Respondents is that the general principle of three years of limitation should be taken as the normal rule for preferring the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. THE decision in the case of Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Mohammad Amri Khan (1), has also no application to the facts of the present case as it pertains to the pre-amendment period and the question of delay/laches was not considered in that case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. THE High Court decided the writ petition and the appeals by special leave to appeal were dismissed by the Apex Court. In the Case of Mohammed Usman Vs. Union of India, (2), it was observed by this court that an illegality committed by any party should not be allowed to prevail and the relief should not be denied only on the ground that there is delay in filing the writ petition. If during the period of delay, if any interest right is accrued in favour of the third party or the third party creates the vested right, then the delay cannot be condoned as it will adversely affect the parties in whose favour the rights are vested. But where no vested right has accrued in favour of a third party it can be an important consideration for condoning the delay, if any, in filing the writ petition. THEse observations were made in respect of a dispute regarding the sale effected and the dispute was sub-judice before the Apex Court in a civil case wherein it was observed that it is advisable to the government to follow the decision. THE principles which have been laid down in this decision cannot be said to be applicable in respect of land acquisition proceedings where the land is acquired by the State Government either in public interest or for the purpose of government or for like reason and some time even emergency powers are exercised u/s 17 (4) of the Act. This court has considered the delay even of three months as un-reasonable on the basis of which the writ petition was dismissed. Looking to the scheme of the Act, I consider that the period of about two years cannot be considered to be reasonable one for which no satisfactory explanation has been given. If the interpretation of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then the result would be that in the matter of land acquisition the writ petition would be filed after the possession is taken and everything has come to an end within a period of three years. THE action has to be taken by the aggrieved person at the proper time without wasting any time and if the proceedings are allowed to continue, then it would be considered that either he has waived his right or he is not aggrieved by such an action. THE matter with regard to land acquisition has the effect on the society in general and the action is being taken in public interest. In such a case the aggrieved person has to be very conscious and alert for challenging any right immediately rather then taking shelter of other acts where the public interest is not involved. In these circumstances, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there should be laches resulting in conforming the right on other side has no substance in the matter of land acquisition proceedings.

(3.) THE award u/s 11 has reference to (1) area of land; (2) the compensation which could be allowed for the land; (3) the apportionment of the said compensation amongst the persons interested in the land. This is very basis for adjudication of award in the proceedings by way of reference u/s 18 and, therefore, the remedy against objections on any of the points is by way of reference under Sec. 18. THE validity of the notification u/s 4 or declaration u/s 6 which is being challenged has to be before the award itself. Now the question arises as to within which time, the notification u/s 4 or declaration u/s 6 should be challenged. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the challenge should be within a reasonable time. What is the reasonable time is a question of fact and may differ from case to case. In the present case the writ petition was filed on 16. 4. 1994 whereas the declaration u/s 6 was issued in March/may 1992. THE petitioner has not stated specifically as to why the notification issued u/s 4 or the declaration u/s 6 have not been challenged within reasonable time.