RAMESH CHAND PANDEY Vs. BABU LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WHILE interpreting the provisions of any statute, what should be the approach of the Court? Should the Court adopt literal grammarian approach notwithstanding the fact that by adopting such approach the very object of the Act may be frustrated? Or, the approach should be to consider the history of the legislature, scheme of the Act, object underlying the provisions, the context in which the expression or words used in the concerned Section occurred, and thereby to discern the true intention of the legislature? This in short, is the question which has surfaced in this Revision Petition which has come up before Division Bench on account of a question having been referred to larger Bench by a learned Single Judge of this Court.

(2.) FOLLOWING question has been referred to Division Bench by learned Single Judge (Coram GS Singhvi, J.) as per order dated August 27, 1992 : " Whether the order passed under S. 13 (5) striking out the defence of a tenant against eviction would apply to all grounds of eviction specified in S. 13 (1) (a) to (1) and other laws or such striking out is limited to the defence against eviction on the ground specified in S. 13 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950?"

(3.) THE case of Inder Chand vs. Smt. Lilawati (supra) was revision petition arising out of a suit for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent and for reasonable and bona fide necessity of the premises. After the written statement was filed by the defendant, the Trial Court had passed an order determining the interim rent under Section 13 (3) of the Rajathan Act. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had committed default in making payment of rent. Hence the plaintiff filed an application for striking off the defence. THE Trial Court passed an order dated March 3, 1986 and struck off the defence of the defendant- tenant. THE Trial Court held that the petitioner-defendant could not be permitted to lead evidence on any of the issues. In the opinion of Trial Court, if defendants were to be permitted to lead evidence, it would amount to re-consideration of the earlier order dated March 3, 1986, by which the defence w|as ordered to be struck off.