NEW INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Vs. KESHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned counsel for the parties.

(2.) All these four applications for condonation of delay are being disposed of by this common order as they are filed in appeals arising out of the common judgment passed by learned Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Banswara on 20th October, 1993. There is a delay of 16 days. The ground which is sought to be made out for condoning the delay is of administrative exigencies. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh, reported in 1994 (6) JT (SC) 372, Mr. Gupta submitted that the delay be condoned.

(3.) There is no straight jacket formula for condoning the delay in all cases on the ground of administrative exigencies. First of all, the case has to be made out for the same and delay has to be explained by making out a sufficient cause for condoning the same. The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Umrao Singh would not apply to the facts of this case. The facts of that case were peculiar. In that case, the father of the petitioner who was serving as Sub-Inspector or, CID (Special Branch) died while on duty. His son applied to the State for appointing him on compassionate ground, and he was appointed as L.D.C. on compassionate ground. After accepting the appointment as L.D.C., he sought appointment as Sub-Inspector, which was denied by the State. Therefore, he filed a writ petition before the learned single Judge of this High Court. The learned single Judge directed the State Government to consider his candidature for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector in accordance with the Rules. That judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the State in Special Appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. There was a delay of 112 days in filing the said appeal, which was not condoned by the Division Bench. The appeal of the State was dismissed on that ground alone. Aggrieved by that order passed by the Division Bench of this High Court of not condoning the delay and deciding the appeal on merits, the State Government moved the Supreme Court by way of S.L.P., which was allowed by the Supreme Court. While allowing the S.L.P., the Supreme Court found that the delay was caused on account of administrative exigencies and the failure to condone the delay resulted in injustice to the State, because the judgment of the learned single Judge had set the bad precedent. Under those circumstances, the delay was condoned by the Supreme Court, and instead of remanding the matter to the High Court, the Supreme Court decided the matter on merits and allowed the S.L.P. and set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court.